Acta Universitatis Danubius. Œconomica, Vol 12, No 2 (2016)

Remuneration In European Commercial Banks

József Tóth

Abstract


One of the causes of the financial crisis started in 2007 was the excessive banking risk taking. Managers of large banks motivated by promise of fabulous variable remuneration had taken such risks that afterwards caused significant loss. According to the new rules to be applied in the European Union, data on compensation of material risk takers are to be disclosed from the year 2014. Furthermore, the variable remuneration of material risk takers must be limited.  This article aims to overview the different expectations regarding remuneration of bank managers highlighting the requirements of European Parliament and Council as well as aims to analyse data of 18 European banks disclosed based on the new lawful requirements. Also, the goal of the paper is to look for such predictor values that determine the number of material risk takers. Based on the empirical study and using linear regression method, it proves there is correlation between number of material risk takers and value of total assets. The result shows that one milliard euro increasing in value of total assets raises the number of material risk takers by 0.6 headcount. However, this correlation is not too strong.


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