Managing Communal Conflicts in Africa through Electronic Media: A Case Study of Radio Nigeria in Share-Tsaragi Crisis

Raji Shittu[1], Niyi Ameen Abdulkadir-Imam[2]

Abstract: Communal conflicts have ravaged many countries in Africa, leading to destruction of lives and property. Previous studies have confirmed that the electronic media sometimes instigate these conflicts because of its capacity rating as a powerful tool for mass mobilization for escalating or deescalating violence due to its wider audience. However, the electronic media also mediates conflict through peace advocacy, peace parley and conciliation programs. This paper examined the emerging paradigm of using radio as manager of conflict in Africa by specifically assessing the extent to which the mediating roles of Radio Nigeria, Idofian have impacted on the communal conflict between Share and Tsaragi in Kwara state of Nigeria. The paper, which relied on secondary data, found that the mediating programmes of Radio Nigeria have de-escalated conflict between the two affected communities. Some of the programs identified for de-escalating the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis include but not limited to; facilitated round-table mediation programs for the representatives of Share-Tsaragi warring communities to discuss their Conflict Position on radio, and running frequent jingles on the danger of violence confrontation between the two communities and beyond. Radio Nigeria also collaborated with the National Orientation Agency (NOA) of Nigeria, to discuss Peace Advocacy program for the two communities in its Station, free of charge and also covered the proceedings of the Administrative Tribunal set up by the Kwara State Government of Nigeria to suggest the appropriate solutions to the crisis. The station also organized sporting events for the youth in Share and Tsaragi to foster unity between the two communities, amongst others. The challenges confronting the station in its task of mediating communal conflict generally and in the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis in particular include logistic problems, vulnerability of its reporters to danger of physical injury or death in the battlefront, and accusation of bias reportage against the media by few members of the warring factions. Concerned authorities should address the above challenges to facilitate the optimal use of Radio as a credible avenue for managing communal conflict in Africa.

Keywords: media; radio conflict; management

[1] PhD, Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, Address: 1515, Unilorin Staff Quarters, Amodu Bello Way, Ilorin, Nigeria, Corresponding author: adraj2010@yahoo.com.
[2] PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and Governance, Kwara State University, Nigeria, Address: P.M.B 1530, 23431, Malete, Kwara State, Nigeria, E-mail: ameeniyi@yahoo.com.

1. Introduction

Since the end of the cold war, and even before it, political, communal and inter ethnic conflicts along ethno-Religious crises have ravaged many countries in Africa. Such internal turmoil has greatly destroyed countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Other countries that has been negatively affected by inter communal conflict are Angola, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Although, struggle over land resources and geographical boundaries have being the dominating themes of many conflicts in Africa, many of such conflict issues have transcended land matters and dispute over border demarcation to include religious bigotry, dispute over chieftaincy title, struggle over political power and competition for scarce resources within and between indigenes and settlers, amongst others.

Instances of communal conflicts abound in Africa. There was communal crisis in the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities of Kenya in 1992, where 5,000 lives were lost and 75,000 people displaced in the Rift Valley Province. (Magenyi, 2016) Although, the communal dispute was about land, it soon transcended to struggle over political power in which politicians instigated and armed their supporters to fight for their land in order to gain their political support, and to enhance the credibility rating of politicians as advocates of peoples' right. In the Central African Republic, there were recorded cases of communal violence that were largely motivated by religion. Although the Central African Republic crisis had been there for a very long time, the immediate cause of the religious crisis in the country in 2014 revolves around religion intolerance and accusation of tribal marginalization. This led to inter ethno-religious attacks and reprisal attacks between the Séléka's Muslim fighters and the Christian militias called "anti-balaka", meaning anti-machete or anti-sword. (David, 2015) According to Human Rights Watch (2015), the Séléka gunmen massacred no fewer than 40 civilians who were mostly Christian militias while the Christian Militias who are in the majority embarked on ethnic cleansing of the Séléka's in retaliation for the attack. The inter-communal crisis led to the displacement of about 200,000 people and 34 villages in 2013. (BBC, 2013) In Sudan also, the Rizeigat and Bani Hussein Arab tribes in the Darfur and West Kordofan region engaged the Nuer and Murle African ethnic groups in South Sudan in serious warfare over religion intolerance and right over graze land. The incessant conflicts led to the death of about 9,000 people. (Xan, 2009) There are cases of inter -communal conflict in Ghana, particularly in the Northern Region. One of these conflicts was between the Konkomba and Dagomba tribes, which borders on the struggle for the autonomy of the latter from the former. (Sulemana, 2009) There is also constant inter communal

clash between the Andani and Abudu clans in the Dagbon Traditional Area of Ghana over competition for chieftaincy title, in which the Chief of Andani, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and 40 elders in his community were killed in 2008. (Anekunabe, 2009)

The communal crisis in Angola between the Mbundu and the Ovimbundu tribes over competition for political hegemony literarily led to large scale violent which erupted between the two ethnic groups immediately after Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975. (Marcum, 1988) The crisis that lasted for 27 years led to the death of more than 200,000 people and the displacement of over one million refugees. (UNDP, 2013) Nigeria as a heterogeneous country with diverse culture and ethnicity has been experiencing inter-communal conflict since its independence in 1960. One of such conflict is the Share - Tsaragi crisis in Kwara state, which traced its root to deadly competition over land and its resources since 1978. The above instances illustrate the devastating effects of communal conflict in Africa.

The intra and inter communal conflict in the continent is sustained further by the proliferation of ethnic militias, which are formed to champion intra communal development aspirations and promote inter group interest, sometimes through violence, leading to destruction of many lives and property. Examples of such militia groups in Africa are the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), and National Liberation Forces (FNL) in Burundi. There is the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and the Niger Delta Avengers in Nigeria. Frequent militia-induced communal conflict has also undermined social fabrics and fragile economies of the affected countries. For instance, the Niger Delta Avengers has destroyed oil installation worth #2 billion. (Obanga, 2016) Ibeanu (2003) and Ali (2006) identify three types-cum factors of communal conflict in the post cold war Africa. These are conflicts over the struggle for political power, conflict occasioned by contest for access to scarce resources and conflict caused by the struggle over identity affiliation and persistent attachment to territory. Other factors identified for communal crisis in Africa according to Obanga (2016, p. 3) are structural factors relating to inequality in the distribution of collective resources, intense poverty, political repression, wrong religious orientation and indoctrinated worldviews. There is also the problems of distorted information and wrong perception of the intention of other groups considered as "outsiders" as factors responsible for inter communal conflicts in Africa.

One critical stakeholder for evolving a durable architecture for international peace and security, and communal harmony in Africa is the media because the institution serves as a powerful tool for mass mobilization for peace or violence. The power of

the media as instigator or pacifier of conflict was amplified further by McCombs and Shaw (1972), when they argued that media discourse may or may not provoke conflict instantly, but it does set agenda for sustained peace or conflict in the society. As noted by the authors, by discussing conflict or potential conflict issues sustainably, attention of the public is often forced on such issues by the media to convince, and sometimes confuse the public on which security issues are important, and which ones are not. McQuail and Windahl (2008) supported this assertion by positing that the concentration on few issues by the media, unwittingly leads to beliefs by members of the public that the content of discourse on the issues are true and relevant, and that such issues are more important than others not discussed. (Idris, 2016) However, the explanatory variables for the impact of media on conflict in the society have shifted from agenda setting to agenda framing in recent years. As explained by McCombs (2005), framing involves the selection of aspects of reality of a conflict and making it more important through repetitive discussion. McCombs also opined that media framing also promote conflict problematization and solution from the mindset of the media, where it identifies the causes and treatment of such conflict from the perspective and interest of the media or its owner.

The contemporary operational effectiveness of the media is aided by the introduction of advanced technology into its practice. Unlike in the past, when the print and broadcast media, especially the Newspapers, Radio or Television respectively virtually holds sway, the media outfits currently operates online through the internet. (David, 2014) While the electronic media disseminate information to recipients by way of electro-magnetic waves, which makes the platform the fastest, the print media links their literate but limited audience on the pages of newspapers and magazines. However, the relationship between both the print and electronic media is synergistic as newspapers' are being reviewed on electronic media, and read on the internet.

Out of the different types of media outfits identified above, the most noticeable and appropriate avenue for instigating or de-escalating conflict is the Radio because of its rating as the cheapest and most expedient means of transmitting information to the widest listening audience. (Magenyi, 2016) With the advent of mobile phones, information dissemination through Radio has expanded because most of the phones have inbuilt Frequency Modulation band. Consequently, the radio has been used in many instances to cause serious security breach in Africa because of its mega ardent listening audience base. (Alumuku, 2006) For instance, the complication of the Rwandan genocide which claimed over 100,000 lives, happened because a radio presenter from the Hutu majority tribe described the Tutsi minority in a live

broadcast as cockroaches that would be stamped with his foot. (Balogun, 2016) The February 4th, 1992 live broadcast on Radio Nigeria, Kaduna, where an interviewee threatened that there would be blood bath if the Zango-kataf market was ever moved to the new site, ignited the crisis in the area, which claimed around 3,000 lives and 600 million worth of property. (Amnesty, 1993) In 2007, Sudan also witnessed religious violence following the radio reportage of a British schoolteacher in Khartum, Gillian Gibbons, who allowed his pupil to name his teddy bear "Muhammad". The court convicted the teacher for negligence of duty in allowing her pupil to insult the Prophet. In spite of her conviction, Many Sudanese Muslims marched to the police station where Gilliam was detained attempting to kill her, but the Police foiled the attempt. (BBC, 2007)

The above instances are clear indications that Radio plays critical role in negative conflict transformation, and this explains why Government attach great importance to the control of the institution through the Media Broadcasting Commissions across African countries to facilitate its positive utilization for peaceful co-existence amongst the populace.

However, contrary to its traditional indictment as instigator, escalator and de-escalator of conflict, the Radio in recent times has ventured into mediating conflict through Peace Advocacy, Peace Parley, Conciliation and Mediation programs. The specifically designed mediating programs of the radio includes but not limited to; facilitating round table mediation for the representatives of warring communities to discuss their conflict position on radio. Radio stations invite trade disputants for live settlement in the radio house and run frequent jingles on the danger of violence. Some stations partners with the National Orientation Agency (NOA), to discuss Peace Advocacy program on radio, free of charge and organize s sporting events for the youths of the warring communities to foster unity. There is also the practice of bringing religious leaders to radio stations to preach peace. This paper examines the emerging paradigm of using radio as manager of conflict rather than being an instigator or neutral reporter of conflict events. The paper specifically assesses the extent to which the mediating functions of radio stations in Africa have affected settlement of communal conflict, using the roles of Radio Nigeria, Idofian in the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis as a case study.

The first open confrontation between Share and Tsaragi dated back to 1978 when the two communities engaged in violent conflict over commercial motor cycle accident involving indigenes of the two communities. Since then, the conflict has become a major source of insecurity in Kwara state, especially with the current use of

sophisticated weapons, such as the AK rifles by the combatants in the battlefront. The conflict has also led to loss of lives and property. For instance, 14 lives were lost during the December 19th, 2015 clash between the two communities while 5 people were killed on their farms on the 2nd August 2016 crisis, amongst others. (Okasanmi, 2016) Curfew has been imposed on Share-Tsaragi community more than any other part of Kwara State of Nigeria. As the record shows, curfew was imposed on the average of four times in eight months. (Radio Nigeria, 2016) This figure represents an average of one curfew in Share and Tsaragi in every two months. The conflict is gradually undermining human security and the popular appellation of Kwara as State of Harmony. With secondary data, this study identifies the causes of Share-Tsaragi communal conflict, examines the mediating role of Radio Nigeria in the management of the crisis, and assesses the impact of the organization's mediating strategies on the crisis.

2. Review of Literature

Conflict is said to occur when there is interaction between at least two parties whose paramount objectives differ. (Saliu & Aremu, 2013) Such conflict revolves around struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, in which the intention of the opponents is to injure or eliminate their rivals. (Coser, 1996) Horgath (1981) identified two kinds of conflicts, namely; functional and dysfunctional conflicts. Functional conflict occurs when the goals of different groups, departments, organizations or communities clashes but does not lead to violence. The conflict situation here could have a very positive impact on work quality and productivity and could lead to problem solving. This is because the parties involved are still willing to work together. Thus, functional conflict can bring about diverse but relevant ideas, which could subsequently leads to accommodation of more options, development of creativity in the problem solving process. Dysfunctional conflict refers to disputes, disagreement and conflicts that hinder group performance. This type of conflict, which unfortunately is much more prevalent in the Nigerian society, involves people who are not willing to cooperate to bring about mutually advantageous resolutions of common crisis. Conflict escalates very rapidly in a dysfunctional conflict. In this regards scholars of conflict management advocates that conflict should be de-escalated once it arises. (Krentz, 2010) Dysfunctional conflict can bring about many negative outcomes within an organization or community; these include poor communication, discontent, impaired relationships, decreased productivity, reduced group cohesiveness and absolute break down of law

and order. According to Nwosu (2004), communal conflicts stems from unsatisfied human needs because people often represent their interest in conflict positioning and not in their original needs. Thus, competing groups use power and coercion sometimes to get their needs. Suberu, (1996) submitted that communal conflict is caused by structural violence that is largely rooted in inequalities and unequal access to social structures in the society. The author opined that unless those inequalities are resolved, violence would continue in the society.

Holmes (2007) identified two elements of communal conflict, one of which is the negative perception of one another by the groups involved in such conflict. This perception may or may not be accurate, but the conflicting parties believe it is real. Secondly, the issue surrounding communal conflict is something that borders on the interest of both parties, which they irredeemably care for. These two elements of communal conflict are present in the case of Share-Tsaragi crisis as their agitation revolves around land and its resources.

Otite and Albert (2001) identify different communal conflict handling styles to include conflict resolution, transformation and conflict management. Conflict resolution principally aims at settling all the conflict issues amicably and permanently. In a plural country like Nigeria, communal conflict resolution mechanism is multifaceted mainly because of the effect of culture and language identity on conflict generation. Thus, understanding the local indigenous model of conflict management is vital to their resolution. Employing the model is also an important in conflict reduction strategy, which leads to optimal facilitation, mediation, productive counseling and effective conflict therapy. Nader (1998) posited that conflict resolution performs healing functions in the communities, as it provides opportunity for the examinations of alternative pay-off in a situation of stiff disagreements, and restores normalcy to warring communities by facilitating mediating discussions that places conflicting parties in situations to settle their differences permanently. The author opined that conflict transformation within the communities represents a comprehensive set of analytical lenses for describing how conflict emerges and evolves between warring parties, and how to bring about changes in personal, structural and legal dimensions of the conflict through non-violent mechanisms. Otite and Albert (1999) posited that positive communal conflict transformation comes through different institutional platforms. These platforms include actor, issue, institutional and legal transformation processes. The Actor transformation model transforms the mindsets of warring community conflict actors from confrontation to collaboration. Issues transformation transforms the conflict

issues from disagreement to consensus agreement amongst warring parties, the legal transformation removes the legal inhibition to the resolution of conflict while institutional transformation transforms the performance ratings of an organization, from its low to optimal performance to reduce crisis between the organization and their customers. Conflict management strategy covers a wider scope in conflict handling style, including conflict resolution and transformation and it has longer time duration of healing conflict.

David (2014) outlined three major strategies of managing community conflict to include military confrontation, mediation and litigation. While the military option virtually deals with forced resolution of communal conflict, history has shown that armed confrontations do not yield favorable outcome to either of the parties involved in the conflict. What this means is that military option, is not a lasting solution to conflict management. Litigation involves a formal adjudication of the conflict, which produce a winner and the loser. Such context often generates happiness for the winner and bitterness for the loser in conflict management. The author submitted that embarking on negotiation, round-table discussion and settlement offer better remedy for conflict management than litigation. This is because conflict is halt through this option after parties and the Government might have come to realize the futility of military options in managing communal conflict. Conflict management must thus occur in polite atmosphere and context (Otite & Alber, t1999, p. 12)

Nwosu (2004) recognized the ability of radio to mobilize and bring changes to the society. This ability can however be used negatively and positively to dispense hate and love respectively between communities because most people rely on radio as primary source of credible information. The author admonished Radio content producers to have a clear strategy and vision of reporting conflict in such away as to pass correct information across to the listening audience without weeping their sentiment and instigating them to perpetrate violence. Anekunabe (2009) identify the role of media in conflict management which is to design programs that is active to sensitizing the people on possible issues that could generate conflict rather than being reactive to conflict situation through accurate on sensational reportage of violence. The author posited that radio programs should focus on finding solution to conflict issues through dialogue rather than apportioning blames on who did what and to whom.

Alumuku (2006) identified logistic problems confronting media houses in Africa to include malfunctioning of media official vehicles, dilapidated equipment, and inadequate protection of journalists in the warfront along poor remuneration of

journalist. These problems are largely responsible for bias reportage on communal conflict in many parts of Africa. The above logistic incapacitation makes many radio stations to generate and present stage-managed information from secondary sources to their listening audience on conflict issues, instead of being physically present on the battlefield. Obanga (2016) linked the bias reportage of media on conflict to the continuous quest for more democratic system of governance and accountability globally, especially in Africa. Such quest for accountable governance have paved way for the proliferation of radio stations to promote group and sectional agenda, with bias reportage of events and frequent broadcasting of inflammatory statements to cause anarchy in the society. The recruitment of many unqualified journalists who does not possess the prerequisite professional qualification and moral integrity for balance reportage of conflict events compounds the problem of bias reportage of conflict in Africa (Alumuku: 2006). Ndajoko (1999) identified the exclusion of most media practitioners from conflict management training programs to garner knowledge as expert on conflict reportage as a key challenge for the media on conflict management. Sulemana (2009) suggests free access to different medium of information for unbiased reportage of conflict situation. As noted by the author, readers can never get all the facts from just one newspaper, and until people have all the facts about a particular conflict event, they cannot make proper judgment about what is going on the battlefield. The above statement reflects the need for free access to unbiased information because not giving people the opportunity to express themselves freely can cause conflict. However, Doki (2003) contradicted the need to have many information medium. As assumed by the author, though Independent and pluralistic media provide a platform for debate and respect for different opinions, unregulated media can be misused for propaganda purposes to incite hatred and spread rumors, thereby artificially creating tensions.

What the paper deduced from the above discourse is that conflict issues and its management are very diverse and that the media plays an instigating and de-escalating roles in conflict management.

3. Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts Political Settlement theory as its analytical guide. This theory relies on political negotiation, settlement and resolution of intra and interstate conflict rather than litigation that is time-consuming and adversarial in nature. Political Settlement theory was made popular by the work of Barrington (1993). The

general assumption underlining the theory deals with how political institutions, rather than legal, serves as the circuit breaker of conflict and the platform for peace building. (Krentz 2010) The central thrust of the theory revolves around a consensus arrangement for the settlement of conflict amongst contenders outside violent confrontation or litigation, which tends to amplifies conflict. In a converse dimension, political settlement theory also described political management of conflict through unequal condition of benefits to the conflicting parties due to the influence of the political leadership, which favors the domination of one group over the other because of the influence of such group or its members on the political power holders. The political settlement theory best explains the Share and Tsaragi conflict because of Tsaragi's alleged injustice levied against the Kwara State government since the State Governor, Abdulfatai Ahmed, is an indigene of Share, one of the conflicting parties. Although the influence exerted by the governor in support of Share were mere allegation, it has made the Tsaragi people to boycott the peace process constituted by the government on many occasions due to what they described as lopsided composition of the membership of the commission of enquiry in favor of Share.

4. The Study Area

Share and Tsaragi are two communities located in Kwara state in the North Central region of Nigeria. Kwara state consists of different ethnic groups, including Yoruba, Fulani, Nupe, and Baruba, among others. The Shares are Igbominas from the Yoruba extractions while Tsaragis are Nupe speaking people. Share is the Headquarters of Ifelodun Local Government Area of Kwara state and Tsaragi is in Edu local governments, which are two out of the 16 Local Government Areas in the state. In spite of the fact that the two communities belongs to different local government areas, they are examples of borderless settlements of two distinct ethnic groups brought together in close proximity and common geographical boundary by the Bariba war of 1818. There are different historical accounts of the relationship between Share and Tsaragi. One account claimed that the Yoruba were the first to at the present site of Share in the year 1818 A.D. (Baba, 2016) Shares were the Igbomina speaking dialects of Yoruba extractions that came as hunters to hunt for Ivory. The Igbominas left *Ahun*, their home place having being dispersed by the Bariba war and first settled at Sakama, a place in the Eastern part of Share. Another version of the historical account claimed that the Yoruba left Oyo-Ile (the capital of Old Oyo Empire) because of their dispersal by the Bariba expansionist wars of 1816.

The Bariba Army attacked Igboho, which was the then capital of the Old Oyo Empire, in which the Oyo forces were defeated, and this dispersed its indigenes into different directions, with some settling down at the present day Share. One of them had discovered the site while hunting and had found the river Soose, thus he led the group to settle near the river. (Tamuno, 1986) Share was initially demarcated with wood, from where the title of their king Olupako (the owner of the wood) was derived. The Bariba Jihadist also waged war against the Nupes who were initially at Sakama, but eventually settled amidst the Yoruba people in Share having been dispersed by the Bariba war. (Baba, 2015) However, due to frequent frictions between the Nupe and the Share Yoruba ethnic groups over right of ownership to farm land, the Nupes were commanded by the Onipako,who initially accommodated them to move to a segregated settlement near "Opoto" tree (Olive tree) from where the Nupes derived their chieftaincy title of Nda Opoto (the man leaving beside the Olive tree). Their chieftaincy title was later changed to Emir and later to Etsu Nupe. This segregated Nupe settlement was named Sharegi (small Share). However, in the course of ceaseless rivalry over the access of the two communities to land and the river Soose, Sharegi was renamed Tsaragi (small river in Nupe), in apparent reference to river Soose. (Baba, 2015)

However, the Nupe oral tradition claimed that the first settlers at Share were the Nupe, who left Atagara, settled at Sakama and later in the nineteenth century were driven by the Fulani Jihadist to Share. At Share, the Yoruba people came and stayed with them, but because of cultural differences the Nupe people established a segregated settlement at the present day Tsaragi. (Ndajoko, 1999) While Share and Tsaragi shares a common boundary, they speak different languages as Yoruba and Nupe speaking people respectively. The communities also patronized common market, shares same religion and inter-marry. In spite of the healthy social relations between them, they have experienced escalated inter-communal conflicts leading to wanton destruction of lives and property, and strained relationship.

5. Conflict Timeline between Share and Tsaragi

The Share and Tsaragi communities had cohabited peaceful since 1800 until 1946 when the Native Administration Reforms were introduced as a crack in the hitherto cordial relationship between the two communities. The reforms placed the two communities under different divisions with Igbomina in Ekiti and Patigi in Lafiaji division. Because of this administrative separation, the needs and interests of the two

communities changed. For instance, the Olupako of Share and the Ndapoto of Tsaragi started having problems in their areas of control over tax collection for their different divisions. (Kwara state Gazatte, 2009) The dispute between the two communities became manifest in 1976, when Irepodun Local Government Area was created with Share as the Headquarters while Tsaragi fell under Edu Local Government. The new status of Share meant more developmental projects, which increased the demand for more land that encroached into Tsaragi. The Kwara State official Gazate of 2009 instigated the dispute further when it issued a legal notice declaring Share an urban area. This administrative status automatically gave Share, as a local government headquarter the constitutional right to acquire more land. Using this instrumentality of legal land acquisition, Share began to encroach on the Tsaragi land for developmental projects, a practice the Tsaragi resisted with subdue tension.

The first open confrontation between the two communities happened in In 1978, because of a motorcycle accident, which involved both Share and Tsaragi indigenes. The accident, which took the life of the Tsaragi indigene lead to violence perpetrated by the Tsaragi community against Share in retaliation for the death of their kinsmen. A Commission of enquiries was set up by the Kwara State Government to investigate the causes of the conflict. The outcome of the panel was not made public neither was its recommendations implemented. The non-implementation of the panel recommendations led to further violence between the two communities, especially between 2000-2008.The violent caused the death of 28 people and destruction of property worth #128 million Kwara. (Gazette, 2008) Different committees were set up to investigate the crisis between 2000 and 20008 but this did not stop the incessant clash between Share and Tsaragi. There was another violent confrontation between the two communities on December 19th, 2015, leading to the setting up of Justice Sulaiman Akanbi Judicial Commission of Enquiry, to examine the causes and actors in the crisis, and come up with appropriate recommendations. Soon after the commission begins its work, the Tsaragi community decided to stay away from the exercise having accused the state government of supporting the Share people because the Governor, Abdulfatai Ahmed is from there. However, the state governor overwhelmingly and convincingly denied the allegation by stating that the fact that he is from Share can not influence his decision on the security matter of the state, which he sworn an affidavit to protect as a public office holder. Before this time, four different commissions of enquiries were put in place by previous administrations, both at federal and state levels, to resolve the conflict with marginal success. These commissions included the Justice Mamman Nasir Boundary

Adjustment Commission of 1978, Justice Mbanefo Commission of 1996, Simon Sayomi of 2002 and Justice Mahmud Abdulgafar panel of 2008. The commissions were mandated to investigate and ascertain the immediate and remote causes of the violent, to determine the circumstances leading to loss of lives during the disturbance and determine whether any person or group of persons caused or contributed to the crisis. (Kwara Gazette, 2009) However, the state government did not implement any of the panel recommendations formally to the satisfaction of the two parties. Rather, none implementation of the recommendations of the panels contributed to the crisis. For instance, while making reference to the Justice Mamman Nasir Boundary Adjustment Commission which was the first to be set up by the federal government of Nigeria on the crisis, the Tsaragi community said the Commission visited the two communities, and came up with recommendations which was leaked to them to be in their favor. The refusal of the state government to adopt and implement the resolutions, and the insistence of Share community that Justice Mamman Nasir's report be dropped, because it was not favorable to it, served as a remote cause of the crisis between Share and Tsaragi.

As posited by Baba (2015), findings from the commissions have revealed the remote and immediate causes of the conflict between Share and Tsaragi to include the following:

i. The failure of the successive government in Kwara state to implement the reports of previous Commissions of enquiry and Administrative panels established to investigate past boundary disputes between the two communities;

ii. The change in the status of Share as the Headquarters of the Ifelodun Local Government Area, which gives it strong legal and administrative powers to encroach on the land of Tsaragi for developmental purposes;

iii. The expansion of Ifelodun Local Government developmental projects in Share beyond its geographical boundary into the Tsaragi enclaves;

iv. The unlawful attack on the members of Share Muslim Association at the site of the proposed Muslim College by the Tsaragi youths, which they claimed belong to them; and

v. The frequent destruction of farm produce and economic trees by war combatants ,which has permanently impoverished many farmers in the two communities;

vi. The construction work at the Share Muslim Association secretariat, which the Tsaragi people claimed belong to them.

The crisis between Share and Tsaragi had devastating effects on sustainable development in the two communities, as many lives and property worth #420 million have been lost. In the December, 19th, 2015 violence, six people lost their lives while the Iyeru Okin Micro Finance Bank in Share lost over 8 million Naira to the vandals after being burnt. (Balogun, 2015) Six police officers were also injured during the crisis. (Isaac, 2015) 34 houses, 3 mosques, 11shops, 5cars, 13,motorcycles and 3 schools serving both communities were burnt because of the violence clash. (Olaosebikan, 2016)

6. The Origin and Roles of Radio Nigeria in Managing the Share-Tsaragi Communal Crisis

The Colonial Government introduced radio broadcasting into Nigeria in 1933 as Radio Diffusion Service (RDS) because the diffusion content allows the public to listen to British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) through loudspeakers. (Radio Nigeria, 2009) The institution later transformed into the Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation in 1957.The British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) Nigeria annex, was later renamed Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), in 1978 as Africa's largest radio network. FRCN is a public institution with Headquarters in Abuja; it has 37 other branches across the country. The Radio Nigeria, Harmony FM, Idofian is in Ifelodun Local Government Area of Kwara state, and it commenced operation in 2002. Since its establishment, the Station has been contributing is own quotas to conflict management and peace processes in Kwara state, one of which was its mediating roles in the Share-Tsaragi communal conflict.

As part of its cooperate social responsibility on peaceful co-existence, Radio Nigeria took it up as a duty to discourage hate speeches and songs of war in Share and Tsaragi communities that could further escalate the crisis. This was done through jingles, news bulletin and commentaries, amongst others. These programs were designed towards sensitizing the people of the two communities on the need to embrace peace and honour a round table discussion to resolve the conflict. The radio station invited the representatives of kwara state government and security personnel at regular interval as guest discussants on ways of fostering peace between Share and Tsaragi. The neutral mediating roles played by Radio Nigeria made the conflicting communities to have trust in the station for a balanced and unbiased coverage of the conflict. The trust made the warring communities to rely on radio Nigeria through personal visitation and phone calls on the authentic conflict bargaining position of

the two communities and government position on the resolutions of the crisis. Radio Nigeria also visited the two communities for interviews in order to make a balanced report on the crisis. The station carried out an independent assessment of the crisis by interviewing neutral persons living within the communities. Those interviewed included the Divisional Police Officer (DPO), the Commandant of the Civil Defence (CCD), and some non- indigenes living in the area for an unbiased reportage of the conflict. The Radio station in Idofian also invited Religious leaders to admonish their adherents in the two communities to embrace peace and dialogue in the resolution of their conflict. Thus, both the Islamic and Christian clerics were invited by the Station to speak on; the importance of peaceful coexistence, Spirit of forgiveness, and need to eschew vengeance between the communities and beyond. An Islamic Scholar, Dr. Abubakar Aliagan from the Department of Islamic Studies, University of Ilorin, and his counterpart, Dr. Abdulhameed Olohunoyin were invited regularly for live religious admonition for both communities and the general audience on the topics listed above. Pastor Sam Aweda also spoke extensively on air to the two communities on the evil of vengeance and benefits of forgiveness. These admonitions served as catalyst for de-escalating the conflict between the two communities and brought relative peace to the area.

The Kwara State Government, who is the chief mediator in the conflict was invited to the station to talk about government's position and plans on the conflict. The representatives used the opportunity to clarify the conflicting issues between the two communities on a neutral media ground, having being successfully blackmailed by the Tsaragi people as a biased mediator who uses the state own media to support the expansionist mission of the Share community, where the sitting Governor comes from. The Kwara state government's Spokesman, Muyideen Akorede also featured on specially designed programs by the station to convey government genuine interest of working out an acceptable peace accord for both communities. In addition, between December 2015 and August 2016, when the intensity of the crisis was high, a number of live round table discussion were organised by the Management of Radio Nigeria, Harmony FM, Idofian in collaboration with the kwara State Director of National Orientation Agency (NOA), Felix Olowookere, for the youth of the warring communities. The youth were taught through live workshop in the station, different conflict management mechanism skills with which to reconcile their two communities in order to promote peace in their area.

The NOA was also availed the opportunity to use the station's airtime free of charge to admonish the Share and Tsaragi communities on the importance of peace to

development in their respective community. Thus, English and Yoruba Audience Participatory Programmes like Kwara on the Move and *Alejowa (Our Guest)* frequently featured some Principal Staff of NOA in the state to discuss peaceful co-existence between the two communities and beyond. Jingles in Nupe and Yoruba languages were also played on regular basis on Radio Nigeria to appeal to the conflicting communities that war is costly and its effects spare no one, irrespective of age, sex, status, cultural or religion background. Some of the jingles also emphasized the importance of peace to development. The jingles were rolled out during popular radio programs like *okodoro-oro (factual news)* and breakfast show, which attracts wider listeners. The Station also relayed the peace messages as interlude at least thrice in a day. Radio Nigeria News Commentary was relayed regularly to discuss issues of peace and development in the two communities, and its implications for kwara state and Nigeria at large.

Apart from the in-house broadcast of Radio Nigeria, which was targeted at de-escalating the Share-Tsaragi conflict, some of its reporters were at the scene of the crisis, as well as the seat of the Justice commission of enquiry at Ilorin, where they filed an unbiased report on the crisis. The above mediating roles of Radio Nigeria reasonably de-escalated the Share-Tsaragi communal conflict. In spite of these efforts, there are challenges confronting the Radio in the management of the conflict. These includes the vulnerability of reporters to death in the warfront, unsubstantiated accusation and counter accusation of reporters by some members of the two communities on bias reportage of the conflict and logistic problem, especially in the area of transportation to visit both communities on regular update on the crisis.

7. Conclusion

The study noted that intra communal and inter ethnic conflicts have ravaged many countries in Africa, leading to destruction of lives and property. The media is one of the instigators of these conflicts because of its rating as a powerful tool for mass mobilization for violence. Out of the different types of media outfits identified for instigating violence, the Radio is most noticeable because of its feature as the cheapest and most expedient means of transmitting information to the widest listening audience globally. It is in realization of the need to promote peace in the society that Radio Nigeria complemented the Kwara state government efforts at restoring peace in Share and Tsaragi in line with its motto; "uplifting the people and uniting the nation". Findings from the paper affirmed that Radio Nigeria has played

positive role in managing the Share-Tsaragi conflict through Peace Advocacy, Peace Parley, Mediation and Conciliation programs. These efforts have greatly led to the de-escalation of the conflict. From the report made available to the radio on the conflict, it is suggested that permanent police post should be erected on the disputed land to curtail further violence between the two communities. The Kwara state government should effect the physical demarcation of the geographical boundary between the two communities while the communities should hold regular meetings to address and correct misgivings about each other. Through this effort, both parties would be able to identify their conflict problem premises and jointly proffer solution to them. The Local Government functionaries and the traditional rulers should be part of the commission of enquiries. This strategy would give people more sense of belonging when they see their relatives in the peace building panels. The Share and Tsaragi communities should explore legal means for their agitation on the crisis rather than result to violence that could destroy the present and future generations in the two communities. Employment opportunities should be created by the state government for both communities to keep the youth busy and eschew them from taking arms against one another. Kwara state government should also implement the recommendations of previous commissions of enquiries to restore the confidence of both communities in such reconciliatory process. With the enrolment of all the above suggestions into the peace process in Share and Tsaragi, sustainable peace may likely return to the two communities.

8. References

Akinteye, B. (2001). *Zango- Kataf Crisis: A case study.* In Otite, O. & Albert, I.O. (eds.). *Community Conflicts in Nigeria.* Ibadan; Spectrum Books Limited.

Alli, W.O. (2006). *The Impact of Globalization on Conflict in Africa.* In Shedrack. G.B. (ed.). *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Alumuku, A.T. (2006). *Community Radio for Developmen: The world and Africa.* Kenya; Kolbe Press Limited.

Anekunabe, E. (2009). *Northern Ghana: Ethnic Conflicts and Politics. mobile.ghanaweb.com* retrieved on 29 December 2016, 11, p. 45.

Baba, M. (2015). *Personal Interview with the researchers on Share-Tsaragi Communal Conflict.*

Balogun, F. (2016). *An Eye Witness Account on the Share-Tsaragi Communal Conflict.* Interview with Radio Nigeria. 29th December.

Burton, J.W (1993). *Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy.* In Sandole D.J. & Merwe, V. (eds). *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester: University Press.

Coser, L.A. (1996). *An Examination of the Concept of the Social Conflict.* New York: Staples Press.

David, S. (2013). Unspeakable Horrors in a Country on Verge of Genocide. *The Guardian,* 22 November.

David, Y. (2014). Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide, 1947-1994. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Issue 129(4).

Doki, A.M. (2003). *Mass Media & Conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Public paper presentation. Kaduna.* 27th April.

Freud, L. (2016). *What is Dysfunctional Conflict?* Available @www.ehow.com, retrieved 14 August.

Gamble, T.K. & Gamble, M. (1996). *Communication Works.* New York: McGraw: Hill Co. Inc.

Hogarth, R.M. (1981). Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgemental Heuristics. *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 90(2), p. 22.

Holmes, S. (2007). Towards a Theory of Managing Organizational Conflict. *International Journal of Conflict Management,* Volume 4(2) July.

Ibeanu, O. (2003). *Communal Conflict and Population Displacement in Nigeria: An Exploratory Analysis.* In Nnoli, O. (ed.). *Communal Conflict and Population Displacement*. Enugu: PACREP.

Idris, A. (2016). *Personal interview with the research team by leader of Tsaragi Elders.* Alhaji Abdullahi Idris.6th June.

Ingram, S. (2014). *Political Settlements: The History of an Idea in Policy and Theory.* SSGM Discussion Paper, Australian National University.

John, B. (1990). *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. New York: Macmillan.

Kalilu, R.O.R. (1993). *Costumes and Origin of Egungun*. African Studies, 52, p. 1.

Kreutz, J. (2010). How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research,* 47(2).

Mabogunje. F. (1971). *On Ethnic Identity: A Study of Share/Tsaragi Settlement in Nigeria* (1830 - 1967). *Journal of. Soc. Sci.*, 17(1), pp. 51-57, Kamla-Raj.

Magenyi, K. (2016). *Clashes, Elections and Land: Church keeps watch in Molo*. Available on line at www.irinnews .org, retrieved 29 December, 2016, 14:00.

Marcum, J. (1988). *The Angolan Revolution: Anatomy of an explosion (1950-1962).* Cambridge: MIT Press.

McQuail & Jankowski, N. (2008). *Media Use as Social Action: European approach to Audience Studies*. London: University Luton Press.

Moore, B. (1993). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. London:* Beacon Press.

Nader, L. (1998). *Anthropological Aspect of Conflict*. In (ed.) David L. (ed.). *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan Press.

Ndajoko, I. (1999). *Ethnic Identity: A Study of Share/Tsaragi Settlement in Nigeria* (1830-1967). *Journal of. Soc. Sci*., 17(1), pp. 51-57, Kamla-Raj.

Nwosu, I. (2004). *Conflict Management, Communication and Media: A Conceptual, Theoretical and Introductory Analysis*. ACCE (Nigeria), Prime Target Ltd.

Obansa, A. (2016). A Police report presented before the Justice Sulaiman Akanbi commission of enquiry on Share-Tsaragi communal conflict by the Area Commander of Bode-Saadu Police unit in Kwara state, Mr. Abdulazeez Obansa.

Okasanmi, A. (2016). *A Police report on Share-Tsaragi communal conflict made available to newsmen by Kwara state Police Public Relations Officer*. Mr Ajayi Okasanmi. June, 28.

Otite, O. & Albert, I.O. (2001). *Community Conflicts in Nigeria*. Ibadan; Spectrum Books Limited.

Philips, J.E. (2000). *Domestic Aliens: The Zangon Kataf Crisis and the African Concept of Stranger. London*. International Research Group for Trans-regional & Emerging Areas studies.

Radio Nigeria Harmony (2016). *News bulletin on Share-Tsaragi communal conflict*. December 23.

Saliu, H.A. & Aremu, F.A. (2013). *Introduction to International Relations*. Ibadan: College Press and Publishers Limited.

Suberu R.T. (1996). *Ethic Minority conflicts and Governance in Nigeria*. International Institute for African studies, University Pres Ibadan.

Sulemana, M. (2009). *Understanding the Causes and Impacts of Conflicts in Northern Region of Ghana*. Institute of Economic Affairs, IEA, Ghana.

Tamuno, T.N. (1986). *Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence*. In J J. F. Ajayi & Evans Ians (eds.). *A Thousand Years of West African History*. Ibadan: University Press.

Tijani, A. (2008). On Ethnic Identity: A Study of Share/Tsaragi Settlement in Nigeria (1830 -1967). *Journal of. Soc. Sci*., 17(1), pp. 51-57, Kamla-Raj.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (2013). *Department of Peace and Conflict Research*. Sweden: Uppsala University.

Warren, S. (1977). Cited in Murphy, R.D. (2008). *Mass Communication and Human Interaction*. Houghton: Mifflin Company.

Xan, R. (2009).Women and Children Targeted in Sudan Clash. *The Guardian*. London. 4th August.