

## Joint Security Concepts - Similarities and Differences

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**Abstract:** Studying the concepts of war and peace has played an important role in defining the development of social sciences throughout history. Although the study of these concepts can be observed in time ever since the ancient Greek philosophy, the emergence of international relations, as a distinct discipline, has occurred in the early twentieth century, as a result of the attempts to explain the outbreak of the First World War and to avoid its repetitiveness. As one of the most important concepts used in international relations, the security is one of the most discussed and disputed.

**Keywords:** social sciences; Greek philosophy; international relations

### 1. Introduction

One of the most important concepts used in international relations, the security is one of the most discussed and disputed. As Adrian Hyde-Price writes, “even before the end of the Cold War, the traditional approaches, centered on the state, the most important actor in this field, and those focused on the military side of national security began to be discussed and contradicted”.<sup>1</sup> The author continues, considering that in the twentieth century, “The Short Twentieth Century”,<sup>2</sup> the security environment in Europe has changed dramatically, and the old approaches to national security of German militarism and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (the so-called liberal institutionalism, but also his practical approach, setting up the League of Nations after the First World War), in order to name two extreme approaches there must be replaced to better meet the multidimensional characteristics of the current European security environment.

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<sup>1</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, *Beware the Jabbewock: Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century*, in (Gaertner, Hyde-Price, & Reiter, 2001)

<sup>2</sup> E. Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914 – 1991*, ed. Michel Joseph (London 1994).

Helga Haftendorn highlights the ambiguity of the concept of security, adding that “the security term is ambiguous term both in terms of content and of form: it is a goal, an area of interest, a concept, a research program or a discipline. There is no unique concept of security, but rather several concepts such as national security, international or global security, which refers to different areas and which is rooted in different historical and philosophical contexts.” (Haftendorn, March 1991)

These difficulties for understanding the concept of security and those related to it have increased in the recent years. The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the bipolar balance of power in Europe and in the world and expanding to the East the European security institutions have increased the disputes regarding this concept.

As part of this process, the European security institutions have adapted their concepts to the changing environment. These adaptations and reformulations are the comparison between the security concepts of such institutions, a necessary thing to understand the evolution process of these organizations and their ability to cooperate.

## 2. Comparative Analysis of Security Concepts

In order to understand the security concepts of the two organizations, the study required documents are provided for these concepts and their application. These documents are the European Security Strategy (European Security Strategy), where the European Union, that NATO Strategic Concept (The Alliance's Strategic Concept) for NATO.

**NATO Strategic Concept** includes a section called *Part III - Addressing the security concept in the XX<sup>th</sup> century*, where it is specified that “The Alliance has a broad approach to the concept of security, recognizing the importance of economic political, social and environmental factors, that add to the military dimension.<sup>1</sup> “NATO considers the military dimension of security as a priority, but it recognizes that the factors listed above expand the scope of the concept of security and the appliance of the concept in this way supports the fulfillment of the base mission of the Alliance. NATO also recognizes the need to reform the security environment architecture and that it is not the only institution to do so in Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Part III, paragraph 25.

**The Programmatic Document of the European Union, European Security Strategy**, does not clearly define the concept of security, but in analyzing *Chapter II Strategic Objectives*, it can be identified. In the first paragraph, the document states that “We (EU) must think globally and act locally.”<sup>1</sup> This statement is explained in terms of risk and threat analysis, specifying “the European traditional concept of defense, including during the Cold War, was based on defending against the Soviet invasion. With the new threats the first line of defense is located outside the Union. The new types of threats are dynamic. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming increasingly dangerous with time, without being able to be combated; terrorist networks will become increasingly dangerous. This requires involvement, even before their transformation into crisis. It's never too early to prevent conflicts and threats. “With these provisions in its programmatic document on European security, the European Union emphasizes that it is ready to become a major player in the field and that this process began with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, and it was continued by the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). By adopting these documents, signing and their application, the EU can play an important role in Europe also in its political and geographical vicinity. (Furnică, 2007)

The European Council approved on December 13, 2007, **the Treaty of Lisbon**, as a compromise to overcome the impasse created by the rejection of the Constitution for Europe. Its objective is the creation of a democratic European Union, closer to citizens' expectations and to better meet the global challenges such as global warming and sustainable development and in security conditions. However, this non-ratification by referendum, by Ireland, created a new crisis for the current Swedish presidency of the European Council which is required to solve it.

### **2.1. Similarities and Differences in Defining Security Concepts**

Major geopolitical change in the early 90s and subsequently resulted in a lack of understanding and agreement becoming larger of the two allies, the U.S. and Europe. The source of the lack of understanding was the different perception of the two continents in terms of articulating its foreign policy. Europe was “immersed” in a state of “perpetual peace”, no longer being interested in power, but in setting a context of legal rules and regulations, a process whose result would later be the EU.

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<sup>1</sup> Council of the European Union. European Security Strategy (Brussels, 2003).

European primary objective was to stabilize Europe socially and give economic power. Meanwhile, the *U.S. continues to articulate the principle of foreign policy according to the principle of the anarchic world, where military power was of enormous importance.* (Kagan, 2002) These differences were emphasized by different strategic visions of America and Europe and that the United States, even though it took part in a collective defense alliance, view their unilaterally role of security. All these differences could be increased by the fact that both in Europe and America, the political elites did not have the same Atlanticist vision as their predecessors. To this factor it was added the fierce competition between the two in the economic domain.

This transatlantic rift was felt at the institutional level, defending a competition between NATO and the European Community. On the one hand, NATO feared for its existence: the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought serious doubts about the future of the Alliance, feeling the needed of re-identification of the security objectives and redefinition of institutional identity. On the other hand, it was the European Union, which, at the end of the clash between East and West, had to deal with the fact that up to that point it did not really represent Europe, being an institutional framework for only a part of the continent. *The competition was manifested on two levels: broadening and adding new members.* (Scheffer, 19 March, 2004)

As regards the enlargement, NATO did not include this point in the immediate agenda, after the Cold War. However, the agenda had changed after 1994. This was the year when three East European states, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary began opening pressures for eventual accession to NATO. Start of accession was announced in Madrid in 1997, the three countries joining in 1999.

The European Union proved to be more responsive to the accession of new members, even if it began this process after NATO.

*The two accession processes occurred separately, NATO and EU officials had minimum contact regarding this issue. The lack of connection between the two integration processes was reported as one of the central reasons that rebalanced the relationship between Europe and North America.* Lacking this connection, it could not form a strategic partnership between the two organizations, not having an agenda, if not common, at least similar in terms of integration, it could not give substance to the transatlantic relationship.

The second aspect of competition between the two entities was to define the roles and functions that each must meet in the international context. Biggest challenge was at NATO. being designed to provide Member States defense policy, the redefinition which is difficult to achieve, especially since many analysts did not see in NATO a global range of action entity, nor anything more than an organization providing collective defense.

In the case of European Union, defining the role was an easy process. Since the late 80s, early 90s mainly an economic feature, the only component that was missing to become an internationally recognized power was the political – military one. *With the experience of failures in the 60 - '70 to form a political union, the Member States were prepared to delegate a part of national sovereignty in order to form the foreign and security policy of the Union. This did not mean however that the Union would lose its civil character that it acquired over more than 40 years and that is was disputed the primacy of NATO in providing the security context.*<sup>1</sup>

The Single European Act signed in Luxembourg in 1986, has officially consecrated by one of his titles (III), the European cooperation in foreign policy matters and it has established an EPC Secretariat. However, the Single Act does not refer to a “common foreign policy”, while maintaining a certain ambiguity in the division of competence in the field. (Mureşan, Pop, & Bonciu, 2004)

*By signing the Treaty of Maastricht - February 1992 - of creating the European Union, they have set up the basis of pillar II- the Foreign Policy and Common Security (CFSP), while defining the parameters by which that WEU would become the main instrument for implementing decisions and actions in defense.*

Official views of NATO in the European Union's security policy: NATO seeks a non-bureaucratic relationship based on cooperation, consultation, in order to determine specifically who, when and how to act in case a crisis broke out. For this cooperation to be possible, they must be over the institutionalized debates. The NATO must give up to feel threatened by the new EU policy and EU must focus on many issues that still needed to be in place to become fully operational: the necessary resources to increase the mobility of European forces, the formulation of joint standards NATO-EU, so as the Union to know what are the requirements that needed to be met for cooperation, including the non-EU allies in military planning and political decision-making in the case of the operations lead by the UE,

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<sup>1</sup> M. E. Smith, “The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam” in (Sweet, Sandholtz, & Fligstein, 2001)

developing a mechanism for political consultation and practical cooperation between NATO and EU, forming a institutional framework for arrangements within the NATO would brought into use the instruments and military capabilities for the operations planned within the EU.<sup>1</sup>

As for the official views of the European Union, it was synthesized by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana. In the view of the European Union, the transatlantic rift is more a rhetorical issue and not a real one. The issues facing the transatlantic relationship are not as relevant, if we relate to broad areas of close cooperation between the two institutions. For both NATO and the EU, the global security issues are paramount and the cooperation providing the security to various areas cannot be shaded by some minor differences between these two actors. Taking into account the new security challenges to the XXI<sup>th</sup> century, the two sides need to recognize their deficiencies in order to collaborate effectively. *This means that in case NATO as one of its members, namely the United States would abandon the unilateralism and commit more strongly to the international cooperation. For the EU this means assuming some more difficult tasks for solving international crises.* (Solana, 14 June 2004)

*Once these elements have found their place, NATO and the EU can begin the collaborative process whose result would be to produce a more effective security framework, each entity having a specialized role, but complementary.*<sup>2</sup>

While NATO defines exactly this concept in the basic documents, the EU does not directly, but through strategic targets. This is because the EU Security Strategy was the result of a long process of negotiation, being the first document of its kind undertaken by the Union and the institutions responsible for carrying out this strategy they wanted to maintain a degree of flexibility.

By the clarity of this programmatic document, NATO demonstrated that preparation of such kind of documents represent the task which become routine for the political-military bureaucracy, which is able to use such terms lightly.

Stating with clearly the priority objective, the defense, and the main mission, defending the freedom and insuring the security of all members through political and military means, plus the recognition of the fact that this priority is complete by

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Ambassador (Vershbow, 2000, pp. 4-5). Ambassador Vershbow is the permanent representative of the United States of America at the North-Atlantic Council.

<sup>2</sup> Günter Altenburg, *NATO-UE Relations*, [www.nato.int/issues](http://www.nato.int/issues). Günter Altenburg is the assistant of the General Secretariat of NATO for Political Affairs.

other tasks, ensuring the Alliance's ability to adapt to new security environment, decreasing the importance of traditional methods of ensuring security, the so-called *hard security means*, and the growing importance of soft, in response to new types of risks and threats, by adding to the missions of *crisis management missions* type, that is *partnership*, the mission basis, with security, consulting in defense domain and threatening potential adversaries.<sup>1</sup>

Looking security concepts defined and implemented by the European institutions, it can be concluded that they represent a certain degree of compatibility, complement each other, because each emphasizes a particular aspect of security.

As NATO considers the military-political methods for responding to crises, the EU considers more important than preventing post-crisis response.

EU extends its area of interest globally speaking missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, but using the concept of “global thinking, local action”<sup>2</sup>, it limits the action to the European space and its surrounding area.

However, the disclosure of conflicts around Europe and the need to be open towards the Arab world, it brings to the attention of decision makers the opportunity to actively engage in resolving these conflicts.

### **3. Strategies of the Two Organizations: the European Union and NATO**

Security is based on the political stability, but also on the military one, they are complementary conditionings. A mobile system of European security can be built only if the two components are consolidated. Security policy is based on cooperation, on giving up any idea of imposing stability by means of confrontation. The aim is to promote cooperation to prevent conflicts in the political and military confrontation risk reduction. It also aims at avoiding the escalation of potential conflicts, with special emphasis on promoting the openness and transparency.

The defense and collective security, on the one hand, and the security based on cooperation, on the other hand, are tools fundamentally different, but complementary, of international security policy. Applying the principle of subsidiarity, in the European security organization, presupposes the consideration of a multistage security system: EU, OSCE, NATO and UN. The need for

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<sup>1</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Part I, para. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Council of the European Union. *European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 2003).

correlation, optimizing the cooperation between different institutions becomes more obvious than ever. The developments in EU, the competition between the EU and NATO, the possibility that the national interests of Western countries to prevail over the common ones, the ideological security assessment rather than financial positions, the lack of proper division of labor between participating countries, are the main factors that influence building an efficient system of European security. The institutional progress, give a concrete form to the European contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security. The level of interoperability on which it relates the EU and NATO provides content to the European collective management of the capacity of crisis

#### 4. European Security Strategy

In late 2003, it was launched *the European Security Strategy*<sup>1</sup>, a document that has as its starting point the premise that the answer to risks, dangers and threats to European security should be adapted to each type of them, applying a multifaceted and a comprehensive strategy. **Solana** strategy, as it is known this document, identifies some of the threats and vulnerabilities to the European Union. The strategy identifies as vulnerabilities and risks: global warming and energy dependence of Europe, poverty, hunger, failure of economic growth, etc.

As for the threats, they are: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, hostile attitude towards European expatriates, attacks against the main lines of communication, attacks against European forces of maintaining and / or reconstructing the peace. Some vulnerabilities and threats can affect the entire international system, but others concern only regional and local level.

The European Security Strategy, clearly defines its main objective: the fight against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, organized crime, violent conflict and instability in the vicinity of the Union, combating extreme poverty, hunger and endemic diseases, creating a “ring of good governance “in the Mediterranean area and eastern borders.

The main instruments of European policy used in the management of security domain are the economic cooperation and integration, development aid, assistance in the construction of democracy and rule of law, dialogue, consultation and

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<sup>1</sup> Council of the European Union. *European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 2003).



general partnership or in different areas. The main goal of European security policy is to avoid exclusion of the adjacent countries of the European economic area and the creation of new dividing lines in "Great Europe". The European Security Strategy also aims, at the achievement of full harmonization of political systems and economic and social interoperability between European Union and countries of eastern and southern neighborhood, likely to integrate a broad concept of European cultural space. In these countries the European Union encourages the reforms in political, economic and social domains, solving bilateral disputes through negotiation and compliance with international law, cross border cooperation, implementation of European standards for democratic institutions, rule of law and human rights.

*The fundamental concepts promoted* in the European Union's security strategy is "*democratic security*", according to which the democratic development excludes the war between the countries that adopt as organizing system and that of "*security through development*", according to which the stability and security of state increase in direct proportion to their level of economic development.

European Security Strategy is based on "*solidarity of interests*", which is applied by developing joint projects. To this it is added the principle according to which the consolidation of security must be operated exclusively under the condition of respecting the human rights and not due to limiting civil liberties.

*The European Security Strategy* clarified the way of organizing and practical cooperation with NATO within the meaning of EU access to infrastructure and other resources of the Alliance based on the agreements between NATO and the EU, in the package "*Berlin plus*".

In the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Member States have decided to equip the EU with the means and capabilities necessary to take responsibilities arising from the involvement in the management of contemporary security environment. After the Nice Summit, complementary to NATO Response Force (NRF) it was created the *European Rapid Reaction Force*.

## **5. The New NATO Strategic Concept**

Making ESDI<sup>1</sup> is an irreversible process whose institutional framework will be built by developing relations between NATO and EU, as the process of establishing a common security and defense policy will be developed. Even if all NATO member states have recognized the need for Europeans to have military capabilities independent of the U.S. contribution in order to promote the foreign policy and security policy of the EU, there was the fear that this could lead to a purely European alliance discrimination against European countries that are members of NATO but not of EU, as well as double-taking tasks and resource allocation by NATO and the EU. ESDI development within NATO and the principle of creating a European force, “separable, but not separate”, said in June 1996, the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, are destined to avoid these problems.

The approved formula in Washington in 1999, gives Europeans greater weight in decision making within the Alliance and the EU (until 2000 WEU) tools needed to fulfill their assumed roles.

In the summit communicate in Washington, April 24, 1999, respecting the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Declaration of St. Malo, there are formulated the following principles (Mureşan, Țenu, & Stăncilă, 2006):

- the EU autonomous capacity for action, the right to make decisions and approve military action where it is not engaged the entire Alliance;
- the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and EU, full support to EU members and other European allies for strengthening their defense capacities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
- Ensure that the involvement of European allies who are not members of EU in crisis response operations (operations under EU command), based on cooperative agreements;
- use of NATO capabilities and achievements “separable, but not separate” in operations controlled by the EU.

For the appliance of the last principle, in the situation where the Alliance is not engaged militarily, it is envisaged the closing of some agreements that would rule: access to NATO planning capabilities, availability of pre-established capacities and common achievements on behalf of NATO in the use of EU operations;

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<sup>1</sup> European Security and Defence Identity.

identification of European command options, the effective assuming of full responsibilities and the adaptation of NATO defense planning system, in order to make available the forces for EU operations.

The new strategic concept of North-Atlantic Alliance is considered that the development of a foreign policy and a common security which includes the gradual development of a common defense policy, as required by the Treaty of Amsterdam, it is compatible with the common security and defense policy, laid down on the Washington Treaty. The increase of the security environment is directly proportional to increasing responsibilities and capacities of European allies, with emphasis on security and defense.

NATO officials believe that in the last 10 years the Alliance has found that the technological gap between U.S. forces and those of European nations is growing more and more. This is related to the technological know-how, but also on the fact that after the Cold War, the European nations have reduced their military forces, knowing that there is an immediate danger that came from the Soviet Union. But the Kosovo air campaign outlined clearly in the minds of Europeans that in a modern approach of crisis management and in providing modern ways "to conduct a campaign in such difficult areas, have a big deficit comparing to the U.S." (Klaus P. Klaiber, head of NATO's political problems). The difficulties, to which the allies in Kosovo have faced, have convinced the Europeans that they must work quickly to solve the problems of modern capabilities of crisis management: communications, rapid air transport, air operations for recognition. In turn, the success in Iraq, in spring 2003 have demonstrated once again the exceptional levels of U.S. military equipment.

A key issue for both organizations, but also for Central Europe countries, is the extension process of the two organizations. It is desired that the extending processes must be compatible and mutually reinforcing, because the manifestation of the cumulative effect of the security guarantees of article 5, the modified Brussels Treaty and article 5 of the Washington Treaty. To implement article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty, all countries must be members of NATO. When the WEU was still working, the U.S. opposed to the admission of new countries in WEU, with the status of full members, if they were not members of NATO. It is therefore likely that the extension of EU would depend on the future enlargement of the Alliance, to avoid, as it is estimated, indirectly obtain some security guarantees from NATO's behalf.

Along with the Europeans' attempts to materialize the own component in security and defense matters there were elaborated diverse variants of organization reform, associated with major restructuring activities.

These include:

- advanced Border Protection. The primary mission of NATO, that of collective defense, will be filled with peace-keeping tasks, U.S.A. keeping the European protective role;
- Stability in Europe. NATO will manage the overall security problems on the continent as this it will extend to Central and Eastern Europe;
- Security in Europe. It involves an expansion of NATO missions beyond border protection, until areas that could jeopardize the European security (Gulf, Middle East, North Africa);
- common interests. Taking freedom of action where interests must be defended, namely an "unlimited NATO".

The new Strategic Concept of NATO formulates general objectives: the control of positive changes and of current and future challenges; common security interests in more remote areas; the maintenance of collective defense; strengthening the transatlantic ties to ensure the assumption of new responsibilities; strengthening relationships with partners, regarding the admission of new members; maintaining political will and military resources necessary to carry out the set mission. (Mureşan, Țenu, & Stăncilă, 2006)

The main objective of NATO is to constantly defend the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means, and insure the peace and stability in the region.

The common values that underpin the Alliance and that it intends to defend as democracy are the human rights and rule of law.

The basic principle of operating the organization is the joint commitment and mutual cooperation among the sovereign states in order to ensure the indivisibility of security for all partners. This means to complement national efforts in addressing the challenges regarding the security.

In order to achieve the primary objective, to the North Atlantic Organization there are set the following fundamental security tasks:

- favoring a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment by engaging in peaceful resolution of disputes;
- to act as a forum for consultation among Allies on issues that harm the vital interests and to coordinate the efforts to counter the common risks and threats;
- deter and defend against threats of aggression against the Member States under the article 5 and 6 of the Treaty of Washington;
- the preparation and active engagement in crisis management, including the handling of the crisis response;
- broadening and strengthening partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, in order to increase transparency, mutual trust and capacity for joint action.

Even if it is considered unlikely that the alliance would be exposed to major aggression with conventional weapons, in the wide range of challenges and risks, military and non-military, on security there were included: uncertainty and instability in some areas and the possibility of triggering regional crises, able to evolve rapidly; economic, social and political difficulties conditions from the countries with fragile democracies, or that go through on the path of a market economy; breaking human rights, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes and the disintegration of states; the proliferation of NBC weapons and the existence of a strong nuclear capacities to countries outside the Alliance's possession; possession of sophisticated military capabilities due to dispersion technology engaged in producing weapons; terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and uncontrolled population movements.

The strategic concept provides for the combined forces, as well as the conventional and nuclear one, principles of action, role, missions and directives that must be pursued. The Alliance strategy principles are the allied solidarity, the strategic unity and collective effort, embodied in practical arrangements relating to “joint forces planning, common funds, joint operational planning, multinational command posts formations and an integrated air defense system, a balance of roles and responsibilities among the allies, stationing and deployment of forces outside the host territory, standards and common procedures regarding the equipment, training and logistics, unified and combined doctrine, exercise performance when necessary, cooperation regarding the infrastructure, armaments and logistics.

## **6. Conclusions**

The combined forces missions of Alliance are to deter any potential aggression, to stop advancing the aggressor as far as possible, to ensure political independence and territorial integrity of Member States, to maintain risks to a distance by counteracting the potential ones at early stage, carrying out the response operations specified in article 5<sup>1</sup>, participation in peacekeeping by operations executed in the support of other international bodies. The commitments to the fulfillment of the outlined tasks are reflected by the dimension, training, availability and deployment of armed forces, by the interoperability and permanent maintaining state of efficiency, to ensure the successful operations carried out in an expanded area including the needs of the PFP countries or / and outside the Alliance.

For this we need:

- maintain the necessary size and at a level of appropriate training, of forces to face the missions;
- deployment and stationing forces since peacetime on the Alliance's territory, or, if required, the advanced deployment of forces in an area of interest;
- design and construction of control structures that would ensure the achievement of the command and control for the full range of missions; deployment of the joint command headquarters, for the command and control of multinational and multifunctional forces;
- use of advanced technology, superiority exploitation in information domain and providing skilled personnel for the development of operational capabilities essential for effective employment, ongoing and mobility, survivability of forces and infrastructure, providing support and rotation of forces;
- ensuring rapid response capacity, including a surprise attack;
- provision of the need to mobilization of reserves or reconstitution of the forces if the changes of security environment or long-term developments requires it;
- finding appropriate answers, flexible and timely, likely to block the escalation of tensions;
- protection of alliance forces and infrastructure against the terrorist attacks.

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<sup>1</sup> Washington Treaty signed in April 1949.

After the Cold War, since the second half of the past decade in order to eliminate erroneous perceptions and to combat threats to common security, in the world there have developed many mechanisms for cooperation.

A series of political, economic, security and cultural issues that can be better addressed and resolved in a relatively homogeneous framework, where there is a certain cohesion and common development experience. Regions can provide the adequate framework for the establishment of cooperation mechanisms, which contribute to international security climate.

The conclusion there can be shown a series of actions and new ideas raised together because on the one hand the transformation of NATO and on the other building the ESDP concept within the EU, as follows:

- Both organizations want cooperation as an insurance factor of safety;
- Development of common security policy;
- Transfer of authority for different types of operations, mainly for stabilization and peacekeeping;
- creating an umbrella of security for NATO countries that tends to extend for the EU countries, the uncommitted will be invited to join the Alliance.

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\*\*\**Washington Treaty signed in April 1949*.