

Bosnia and Herzegovina's Euro-Atlantic Integrations

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Abstract: The objective of this research paper is to highlight reasons of Bosnia and Herzegovina's slow progress on its Euro-Atlantic path, in order to propose a final solution. The importance of this issue is relevant particularly now, because on the one hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its official application to join the European Union in February 2016, and on the other hand, it has been blocked since April 2010 on its NATO integration path due to the Dayton Peace Agreement Constitution's paradoxes and historical disagreements. Many authors have previously written about Bosnia and Herzegovina's Euro-Atlantic Integrations but not many of them published academic works after the Bosnian formal application for the European Union membership, which represents an important step for this post-war country. The main approach used is analytical; which includes academic research and understanding of Bosnian contemporary history as a root of current political, economic and social crisis. Finally, the result is that Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress is not satisfactory and moreover, the only solution for the future of Euro-Atlantic Integrations is a reform of its current Constitution, but equally a change of the international community's attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper aims to contribute to further academic research in the field of international relations regarding future integration of the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic bloc.

Keywords: NATO; European Union; Bosnia and Herzegovina; integrations; negotiations

1. Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a country that was one of the six member states of Yugoslavia. After the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, a new geopolitical map of Europe started to be built. Ethnic tensions started to rise in Yugoslavia when its member states such as Slovenia and Croatia wanted to become independent. The most complex case regarding the independence was Bosnia and Herzegovina as ethnically the most heterogeneous country in the union. Bosnia's

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independence referendum took place at the end of February and beginning of March 1992 and its result created strong divisions between Bosnian Serbs.¹ On the one side, many strongly opposed the idea of a referendum and independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on the other side, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were in favour of independence.² Nevertheless, the international community recognized the country as an independent state on the 6th April 1992, which did not satisfy Bosnian Serbs as the majority of them did not even vote in the referendum.³ This led to the rise of nationalism and strong ethnic divisions, which resulted in an armed conflict, ethnic cleansing, violations of Human Rights and horrific human atrocities towards the end of the 20th century.⁴

The Bosnian war contributed to the total dissolution of Yugoslavia, and it somewhat tested the capacity of the whole international community, resulting in a strong reaction to stop the conflict, as the world was not ready for new “*balkanisation*” in this part of Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Bosnian war particularly tested NATO’s “*raison d’être*” in the new epoch of international security. It took more time than usual to intervene, as Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first country in history where NATO has intervened since its creation. NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina facilitated ceasefire, weakened Serbian troops in Bosnia and led to the end of war. New Bosnia was designed by the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on the 14th December 1995 by Slobodan Milošević, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegović, president of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Franjo Tuđman, president of Croatia.

The Dayton Peace Agreement is highly important for Bosnia because its Annex 4 represents the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twenty-one years post-Dayton, Bosnia is currently in a period of peace; however there still remains deep political crisis and social tensions. Moreover, the main priority of Bosnian foreign policy is for integration in the European Union and NATO, as well as closer cooperation with Interpol due to the war crime fugitives. After more than fifty years of socialist regime and after civil war that ravaged the country, Bosnian democratic transition that was respectively imagined by the international

¹Reuters, (2008). Timeline: What happened during the war in Bosnia?, Retrieved from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-karadzic-bosnia-idUSL2164446420080721>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

community has built, as Laurent Geslin declares: “*the most bureaucratized state in Europe.*” (Geslin, 2006, p. 75) The after-war process of state building resulted in positive and negative circumstances. At first, we notice the positive aspect is peace, and the negative one is a high decentralization that highlights ethnic division within the country. Due to the lack of political will for dialogue, Bosnia does not progress and moreover, due to its Constitutional ambiguities, the country is usually blocked on its Euro-Atlantic integration path. The root of the political inefficiency as the reason of unfulfilled tasks required by the international community may be found in a so-called identity crisis in post-war countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina is.¹ Obviously, this country did not have enough time to recover and progress as the other Eastern European countries have done after the collapse of their socialist regimes, such as; Visegrad 4 group of countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic. Identity crisis is one of the core problems because in Bosnia and Herzegovina not every citizen considers him or herself as a real Bosnian and does not want to contribute to further state building. Paddy Ashdown, a former High representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote: “*A state with which its citizens do not identify, and therefore for which they feel no loyalty, will always be vulnerable.*” (Ashdown, 2007, p. 10) Moreover, we should take into consideration that the majority of Bosnians highly regret the break-up of Yugoslavia. Alexandra Stiglmeier writes that: “*Many people still long for Yugoslavia, which offered decent living standards, freedom to travel, and cushy jobs. Unlike countries in Eastern Europe, Bosnia did not want to get rid of socialism – it lost it.*”² Her statement is completely true because if we ever visit Bosnia and if talk to the people, everyone will confirm that the best times were Yugoslavian times and in their words we may notice the presence of that Yugo-nostalgia.

This introductory historical analysis is important for us to understand the complex background of current Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its priorities in building a peaceful and prosperous country as a potential candidate to join the European Union and NATO. Reality remains that the country progresses slowly on its Euro-Atlantic integration path and brings unsatisfactory results in required reforms by the European Commission, Council of Europe and NATO. The main

¹ Filipović, Nataša (2015). Political Crisis as a consequence of Identity Crisis in post-conflict societies: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, link: <https://natasafilipovicblog.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/political-crisis-as-a-consequence-of-identity-crisis-in-post-conflict-societies-the-case-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/>.

²Stiglmeier, Alexandra, Work in Progress: Bosnia 20 years after Dayton, Retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/dayton-20-years-bosnia-serbia/EN/index.htm>.

issue is that its current Constitution, the so-called Annex 4 of Dayton Peace Agreement, produces unexpected paradoxes that could not be foreseen in 1995. After analysing these paradoxes and their impact of Bosnian progress, we conclude that the last resort for future Euro-Atlantic integrations of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Constitutional reform. This should also coincide with the change of the European Union and NATO's confusing conditional policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the country itself is blocked, and results in Russia trying to enhance its role in both Bosnia and the region of the Western Balkans.

2. Reality of Bosnian Path to the European Union

In order to better understand this process, we should start with the Preamble of Bosnian Constitution which says: "*Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows: (...)*" (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). This means that Dayton Peace Agreement recognises only three constituent peoples for having full civil rights and "Others" as mentioned in the constitutional text for not having the same civil rights, which means that the Constitution itself makes a difference between the citizenship and national belonging. In practice, we can better comprehend this Constitutional problem while analysing Sejdić-Finci case. The problem appeared in 2007 when Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, both citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mr. Sejdić of Roma origin and Mr. Finci of Jewish), could not be eligible to stand to election because of their origins.¹ The key of this democratic ambiguity is in the Preamble of Bosnian Constitution, which divides its citizens in two categories: constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) and "Others" (minorities). Two applicants contested the decision of the Central Election Commission at the European Court of Human Rights in August 2007, for not being eligible to stand for election for the Presidency and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly in their own country because of their origins.² European Court of Human Rights decided that this case is a violation of Article 14 on the Prohibition of Discrimination of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the violation of Article 3 of Protocol no.1 on Right to

¹ Council of Europe Office in Belgrade, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Retrieved from: http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545.

² Ibid.

Free Elections and equally violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.12 on General Prohibition of Discrimination.¹ It brought a judgement in 2009 and required Bosnian state to reform its legislation on elections and change of Presidency composition in Bosnia.² Bosnia and Herzegovina has Collective Presidency and not one president. Collective Presidency counts three chosen representatives of Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and this is an example of discrimination of minorities in the country. Furthermore, the dialogue on the implementation of the judgement has been long and complicated. In January 2014, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy – Štefan Füle declared during his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina: *“The result of last night's meeting of the party leaders on implementation of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the 'Sejdić and Finci' case was so deeply disappointing. Implementation of this judgment is not a remote issue or virtual issue. It is an international obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that, following the will of the Member States, is now a key to progress on the EU path. It has real consequences. It means the full entry into force of your Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It means the possibility for Bosnia and Herzegovina to submit a credible application for EU membership. And that inevitably means more reform and improvements in the country and more investments. I want to address this myth that here in Bosnia and Herzegovina we were sort of involved in some kind of virtual issue. No, exactly the opposite - the issue has very clear consequences on the life of each and every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”*³

Even nowadays, when Bosnia and Herzegovina had already submitted its formal application to join the European Union, the implementation of the judgment has not been completed yet. This result of inefficient implementation of required reforms is more than disappointing for the whole international community, and without mentioning other issues, we can clearly notice in this case why Bosnia and Herzegovina stagnates on its EU path. Nevertheless, it is not only the fault of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tomasz Żornaczuk considers that the European Union shows deep enlargement fatigue through its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans. (Żornaczuk & Tomasz, 2016, pp. 1-3) More precisely he names its

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina-EU: Deep disappointment on Sejdic-Finci implementation, Sarajevo, 18 February 2014, Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-117_fr.htm.

approach as “*neither carrots nor sticks*” due to Mr. Juncker’s change of priorities, where the European Union does not even send a clear message to the potential candidates when using the principle of conditionality to help them on their EU path. (Żornaczuk, 2016, pp. 1-3) Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, he considers that: “*There is an immediate need to re-think the approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and to find solutions on how to involve it in the EU integration process, rather than expecting the country to become more centralised and to have less parity in key roles—which has failed since Sarajevo became part of the EU enlargement policy.*” (Żornaczuk, 2016, p. 5) According to him, as a consequence of the weak EU role in the Western Balkans, Russia tries to strengthen its position as he writes: “*The rivalry between Russia and the West turned global to the extent that it is more and more often being called a “new Cold War.” On top of that, it has become increasingly evident in recent months that, with the decline of Union’s interest in the Western Balkans, Russia has been increasing its attempts to re-establish its influence on this EU periphery.*” (Żornaczuk, 2016, p. 5) What was very clear from that statement is that he names the Western Balkans as the “EU periphery”.

We all realise that the international community had a huge role in stopping the war in Bosnia in 1995, and the important role through peacekeeping missions whose result nowadays is absence of conflict, but the reality remains that the Dayton Peace Agreement created a state which is on the edge of failure, with double federalism and complex territorial, institutional and social partition that does not bring positive results. According to Michel Parenti, “*Bosnia was stripped of its economic and political sovereignty under the IMF and NATO regency and the country as it became artificial under international supervision.*” (Parenti, 2014, p. 57). Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles equally with its NATO integrations as the country is blocked due to its complex history. Should Bosnia follow the example of the Eastern European countries that before entering the European Union firstly became members of NATO? This question is going to be discussed in the following sections.

3. Difficulties of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its NATO Integration Process

NATO integration is one of the priorities of Bosnian foreign policy. NATO role in Bosnia has an important significance for this post-war country because the Alliance

has been guaranteeing stability since the end of war. NATO intervened for the first time ever in Bosnia under Operation Deny Flight that was an air-led mission by the United States within the NATO framework.¹ After peace establishment by the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO deployed its first peacekeeping mission of 60.000 soldiers; known as Implementation force or IFOR² It stayed in Bosnia for only one year and was then replaced by a Stabilization force (or SFOR) because NATO did not want to leave Bosnia after its first elections due to the risk of new conflicts emerging.³ As a result of the state-level establishment of Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 that was seen as a progress, NATO decided to leave Bosnia in the hands of the European Union that took these responsibilities under the Eufor Althea Mission.⁴ Additionally, within the framework of Berlin Plus Agreement, NATO still has its headquarters in Sarajevo and supports the country on its NATO path. Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown its friendship and will to cooperate with NATO and it deployed its soldiers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009.⁵ Relations between BiH and NATO are promising and fruitful but after its invitation to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), it has been blocked due to the immovable defence property issue.⁶ This represents conditions set by NATO member states to Bosnia and Herzegovina before joining the Membership Action Plan stating that all immovable defence property has to be declared as the state's property, more precisely the understanding of official declaration of 63 military buildings or barracks as the property of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷ Firstly, one issue is that some of them are still declared as the property of Yugoslavia or they have never been declared during the Yugoslavian times.⁸ Secondly, the issue is that it has not been possible to find an agreement regarding succession and whether these immovable defence properties are Entities' or State's property.⁹ To better understand this issue we should rely on the Article 1.3 of the Constitution: "*Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the*

¹ NATO, Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Stiglmeier, Alexandra, Work in Progress: Bosnia 20 years after Dayton, Retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/dayton-20-years-bosnia-serbia/EN/index.htm>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

Republika Srpska (hereinafter “the Entities”). (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). To clarify this information, the entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consist of ten Cantons imagined during Washington Agreement (1994) and every Canton has its own government and Prime Minister, while Republika Srpska is organised at one level and equally has its own government and President. At the end, the Presidency of Bosnian state represents a Collective Presidency of three people: one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat elected by Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbs in Republic of Srpska for a mandate of four years. This means that the state is highly decentralised and this is a key problem during the negotiations mentioned above. To illustrate what has just been said about territorial organization of Bosnia according to Dayton, we should rely on the following figure taking into consideration that the entity called Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of ten Cantons that are not indicated in this map.



Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dayton Peace Agreement created a divided country within two entities where Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian and Croat region) and Republika Srpska have completely opposed opinions on NATO integrations. For instance, according to a survey done in 2012, Bosnia stands in total at 65% to join NATO, taking into consideration that 82% of people from the Federation expressed their wish to join the Alliance while the result in Republika Srpska is 38%.¹ Nevertheless, the situation regarding immovable defence property disagreements improved a bit since 2012 and where after the decision of Constitutional Court of Bosnia, there are now 40 defence properties to be declared, as 23 have already been allocated as State property.² Taking into consideration what has previously been mentioned, Republika Srpska led by Milorad Dodik who is inspired by Russian brotherhood, seems to block this initiative of defence property allocation under state's possession because the entity wants these properties located on the territory of Republic of Srpska to belong to the entity of Republic of Srpska and not to Bosnian state. In this state of confusion and inefficiency to find an appropriate solution, Alexandra Stiglmyer considers that: *"Today, more than five years later, the defence property issue has still not been resolved, and Bosnia still has no MAP, while Russia has stepped up interference in the Western Balkans, trying to prevent the countries from Euro-Atlantic integration."*³ This means that there is always someone taking advantage of current situations and that NATO or the European Union show a controversial face to the potential candidates for membership. It is clear that the Constitution has to be reformed and that the international community has to refresh its interests in Bosnia. Dražen Peħar writes: *"What can we say about the implementation of Dayton? I believe that the only convenient way to describe the obstacles to the process of its implementation should not include its ambiguous nature, because, properly speaking, those supposed to comply with the Dayton Agreement have not yet recognised its ambiguousness, let alone embraced it. They instead tend to abuse the agreement's ambiguous provisions, to insist on their one-sided interpretation to justify promotion of their out-dated policies that brought misery and suffering to the peoples of Bosnia in the recent past."*⁴

¹Stiglmyer, Alexandra, Work in Progress: Bosnia 20 years after Dayton, Retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/dayton-20-years-bosnia-serbia/EN/index.htm>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴Peħar, Drazen, Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements, Language and Diplomacy, link: http://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/Language_Diplomacy_Chapter11.PDF; page: 186.

After analysing Bosnian position with the EU and NATO, we can clearly see that the main issues are Constitutional ambiguities and international pressure on the country to make progress when it's not able to do so. In the following part we will propose a solution to this problem.

4. Constitutional Reform and Conditionality Assuagement as the Last Resort for a Promising Bosnian Euro-Atlantic Integration Progress

On the one hand, we can see that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not satisfy requirements set by the European Union and NATO because of its Constitutional ambiguities, and also because of historical and current disputes. On the other hand, we understand that the enlargement policy of the European Union towards Bosnia is unclear and unambitious. The use of conditionality in negotiations is something well known and normal, but both NATO and the EU should revive their interest in Bosnia because of its geopolitical position, due to the current Russian interests and Bosnian bloody past. There are two possible solutions for the current crisis in Bosnia. Firstly, the Dayton Peace Agreement should be reformed by which it will be easier to fulfil requirements of both the EU and NATO. Secondly, the European Union should change its enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and more precisely its role in Bosnia because it remains unclear and inefficient.

At first, as many international leaders proposed, there should be a reform of the current Dayton Peace Agreement and introduction of so-called Dayton II.¹ In order to be fully functional representative democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina should reform its Preamble and electoral legislation in order to include and respect rights of all its citizens and avoid future cases as the Sejdić-Finci case. Regarding territorial organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should be divided in multi-ethnic regions but not two entities divided according ethnic belongings. Current entities should not have the same power, which means that state's power should be more centralized. This means that Bosnia would not be bureaucratized, as it is now. Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose population represents a number of around 4 million inhabitants, has too many institutions and people working in public administration, which is extremely costly for the state's budget. For example, according to Laurent Geslin: "*For four million inhabitants, there are 1 200 judges*

¹Roknic, Aleksandar (2016), Berlin bi Dejton 2 i novi ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, Retrieved from: http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/berlin_bi_dejton_2_i_novi_ustav_bosne_i_hercegovine_.56.htm l?news_id=321939.

and prosecutors, 760 parliamentarians, more than 100 ministers and four levels of citizen representation!” (Geslin, 2006, p. 175) At least, if these four million of citizens were represented well, the problem would not be that serious. Moreover, the Collective Presidency seems not to be functional and it is surely not productive to switch Head of Presidency every eight months.¹ This should be changed with the utmost attention in order to avoid imposition of the one over others, which means that there can be one President with functional system of checks and balances. Florian Bieber considers that: *“If the presidency members are elected by the entities without ethnic prefixes, Croats are likely to be unrepresented, and if a fourth member is added to the current three to represent “others” (i.e. minorities), there is a danger of this position being abused by nationalist parties running token minority representatives for the seat. Replacing the presidency with a single president (with two or more vice-presidents) would be the best solution, but is one to which Croat and Serb parties will be reluctant to agree.”*²

Furthermore, the European Union should send clearer message to Bosnia regarding its constitutional reform. Florian Bieber considers that: *“The EU has been particularly ambivalent about constitutional reform, supporting (although not whole-heartedly) the first US-led efforts that failed in April 2006 and then subsequently stating that constitutional changes are not a requirement, but are necessary. Even if this might be right, it has sown damaging confusion.”*³ It is clear that the country cannot continue functioning in the way it has done until now and we all know that constitutional reform has to be done for the good of everyone and it should not be just “necessary” but “mandatory”. Without Constitutional reform and according to the results that Bosnia has shown until now, it risks future stagnation both internally and externally. In his policy paper Florian Bieber proposes how the EU should help Bosnia in order to encourage constitutional reform. Firstly, he thinks that: *“Constitutional amendments should only be introduced through the formal institutional process, not pushed through ad hoc meetings, to reduce the risk of spoiling tactics if only party leaders are included”*.⁴

¹ Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs elect three representatives to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a mandate of four years. During these four years, these three representatives switch every eight months at the position of the Head of Presidency.

² Bieber, Florian (2010). Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: preparing for EU accession, European Policy Centre, Retrieved from: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/1087_constitutional_reform_in_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Secondly, he considers that: “*The goal of constitutional reforms should not be state-building by stealth, but addressing the Constitution's shortcomings in terms of human rights and facilitating EU accession, to re-establish the Union's credibility as a mediator in the reform process.*”¹ Thirdly, according to him: “*The EU should steer the process by providing advice and guidance, offering a clear menu of options to prepare Bosnia's institutional structure not only for accession negotiations but also for membership.*”² We can agree with all these propositions except his last point, which is a contrast to our proposition where he respectively offers different ideas regarding centralisation: “*Reforms should be built on the premise that Bosnia is a fully-functional decentralised country, which includes the Serb Republic as one of its federal units and a state government which can represent Bosnia in the EU.*”³

During the constitutional reform, in order to integrate the EU and NATO, Bosnia should reform its internal security level which is the main concern. For the example of Germany that urged Bosnia and Herzegovina to introduce the Dayton II because of terrorist threats in Bosnia, and number of Bosnian citizens fighting in Syria that should be understood seriously.⁴ We should also take into consideration that the Bosnian Ministry of Security should show initiative regarding the spread of Wahhabist movement within Bosnian borders, because Wahhabist villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a serious threat to security of all Bosnian people and Bosnian values.

Finally, alongside all these reforms, the international community should strengthen its presence in Bosnia and re-establish a powerful High Representative taking into consideration that the person currently at this position is on the way to lose “*raison d'être*”. Alexandra Stiglmyer writes that: “*Between 1998 and 2005, successive High Representatives dismissed hundreds of public officials and imposed many important laws - not really an exercise in democratic decision-making.*”⁵ Establishment of powerful High Representative could only bring positive results on

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³Bieber, Florian. (2010). Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: preparing for EU accession, European Policy Centre, Retrieved from: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/1087_constitutional_reform_in_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf

⁴Roknic, Aleksandar (2016), Berlin bi Dejton 2 i novi ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, Retrieved from: http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/berlin_bi_dejton_2_i_novi_ustav_bosne_i_hercegovine_.56.htm?news_id=321939.

⁵ Stiglmyer, Alexandra, Work in Progress: Bosnia 20 years after Dayton, Retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/dayton-20-years-bosnia-serbia/EN/index.htm>.

Bosnian Euro-Atlantic path and accelerate required and necessary changes while putting pressure on political elite to work harder in office.

5. Conclusion

We can clearly see that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a complete representative democracy and that it faces huge democratic paradoxes due to Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which is basically its Constitution. According to the Copenhagen Criteria, we cannot clearly imagine Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a part of the European Union, even if the country submitted its formal application to join the Union in February 2016. Its European Union path seems very pessimistic and the only solution would be a Constitutional reform and an introduction of Dayton II. Constitutional ambiguities are equally a problem on the NATO path that results in blockages where the country is not able to change anything. Taking into consideration that Bosnia's past was bloody and chaotic, the conditions set by NATO and the European Union seem unclear and unfair. In order to progress, there is a Bosnian obligation to reform its Constitution, and NATO and the European Union should refresh their policies towards Bosnia because of geopolitical interests. In order to integrate a Euro-Atlantic bloc more coherently, Bosnia and Herzegovina should follow the model of Croatia as well as Visegrad 4 Group of countries and firstly integrate with NATO and then the European Union.

6. Future Work

First of all, years 2015 and 2016 were years of doubt and crisis regarding the European Union as a political project and an idea. More precisely, the main pressures were refugee crisis, Brexit and economic situation where the European Union showed its citizens that it is not a strong political union. The situation is deeply confusing, having on the one side certain countries that want to leave and on the other side countries that want to enter the European Union. The European Union is currently not the same as it used to be until the British citizens decided to leave in the referendum whose result represents a turning point for the whole European Union. Reality remains that the European Union is passing through difficult times and only time will show if it will be ready for enlargements in the Western Balkans any time soon.

Secondly, NATO faced a period of hybrid threats from Russian Federation during the war in Syria, Ukrainian crisis and social tensions in the Baltic countries. Moreover, is Russian violation of the Turkish airspace an example of NATO's weaknesses? If NATO is a weak Alliance, then why other countries want to become a part of it? There are many questions to ask and answer because we live in an interesting time, especially interesting for researchers, analysts and students in the field of International Relations and Political Science. Finally, for that reason the aim of this paper is to give an idea and contribute to the future research regarding the European Union and NATO's enlargement in the Western Balkans.

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***Council of Europe Office in Belgrade, *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Retrieved from: http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545.

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