Acta Universitatis Danubius. Relationes Internationales, Vol 9, No 2 (2016)

The European Crisis Management: An Organizational Narrative

Patrícia Kaplánová1

Abstract: The debate of scholars in the field of international relations in last years has put the European Union’s role into the consideration. The European Foreign and Security Policy has positioned itself through its development to the constructive and normative line of research of world politics. With this respect, this article examines a character of crisis management of the European Common Foreign Policy based on the institutional development. Besides the European Union does not possess a unified foreign and security policy, regardless one army and single institutional mechanism, the recent crisis management actions have shaped the policies into a comprehensive nature. The paper overviews briefly the history of Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as Common Security and Defence Policy and focuses on crisis management of civilian and military missions. The author claims that the development has a significant impact on a character of crisis management analyzed from the institutional and financial capacities of the European Security and Defence Policy. Consequently, the character of crisis management performs complex mechanisms of responsive, political/administrative, legal, economic and human help to crisis-affected territories in the world. Respectfully, the character of crisis management has thus more pre-crisis nature of a resilience.

Keywords: crisis management; CFSP; EEAS; ECHO; INFORM

1. Introduction

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched more than thirty operations in crisis-affected territories, mainly in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Consequently, the EU in the scope of world politics positioned itself as a security actor adopting the European Security Strategy (2003). With this respect, the EU has been carrying out several types of civilian and military missions (police and rule of law missions, border management missions, monitoring missions and peacekeeping missions). Although, the final categorization of a character of crisis management is hard to adjust. Based on the work of James Sperling (2014), this paper will try to evaluate the outcomes of overall budgetary expenditures. “When the range of EU operations and missions conducted under the rubrics of crisis management is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the term has served the role of a uniting signifier for very different types of operations.” (Hynek, 2011, p. 86) Regarding the historical development, the crisis management is exposed by the paradigm of comprehensive crisis management (Hynek, 2011; Pirozzi, 2013; Pavlov, 2015) based on a provision of each mission and institutional structure of crisis management at the European level of governance. Other approaches underlying crisis management are based on classical paradigms of international relations like liberalism, structuralism, and realism (Pohl, 2013, p. 307). Exhaustion of topic of this paper does not allow to devote more space also for the main narratives of international relations so the paper deals with the constructive paradigm of normativeness of the EU in the world politics. Regarding this, the institutional structure of the crisis management after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty has emphasized the pre-crisis management approach leading to the new paradigm of resilience.

2 The Development of the European Crisis Management

In early years of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, there was also an attempt to set up the European Defence Community known as the Pleven Plan. The Pleven Plan envisaged a formation of the common army and thus had an initiative to create the European Institute of Common Foreign and Security Policy (Gerbet, 2004, p. 99). Important in this case of the Pleven Plan was an effort to delegate powers of defense policy from the national to the supranational level, which was at that extremely ambitious (Dinan, 2014, p. 65). This plan, however, had failed because of the refusal of the French national parliament (in August 1954) caused by political instability of French Government. The consequence of French internal politics had been an interruption in the process of shaping the common foreign policy for decades. Therefore during this period, the security and defense policy remained as a competence of every Member state e.g. a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as a national policy of every member state. The area of security and defense policy was in fact characterized as “an international extension of domestic policies and problems” (Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 341).

The international relations in the 90s had a significant impact on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. The geopolitical changes in international relations which had made the United States of America (the USA) a leader in world politics and “successor” of the Cold War, helped the USA to ensure their position in security policy also in Europe by strengthening the NATO organization. Moreover, there had become an opportunity for former Soviet states to join the European Community which revived dynamics of the integration. In the early 90s, The European Community adopted the “Petersberg tasks” (1992) as part of the European Security and Defence Policy. For the first time, the Treaty included humanitarian and rescue tasks, tasks relating to the maintenance of peace and tasks of combat forces as a part of a crisis management (Bindi, 2010, p. 29). The EU intended to create the rapid reaction forces, which would be able to intervene in a crisis situation. Nonetheless, this kind of operations would require the United Nations and NATO mandate. The adoption of the Petersberg tasks has shown a willingness to deploy common military units, but the biggest problem were weak and inadequate ways and means of defense forces of most nationalities (Cameron, 2007, p. 74). Bindi and Shapiro characterized this period of the creation of common security and defense policy as: “Eventually, the only result in the field of foreign policy was the so-called CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), which was actually an institutional “upgrade” of the EPC rather than a coherent foreign policy. The European failure to act decisively in the Balkans meant that the 1990s were also the period in which the Europeans started talking seriously about defense. The results were similarly relatively weak institutions (the ESDP) rather than a true common defense policy” (Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 342). Foreign and security policy indeed became part of the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty (in 1992), but not under the exclusive competence of the EU, but was left entirely as a security competence of the Member States.

Military conflicts that occurred at the end of the 20th century, such as the wars in territories of former states of the Socialist Federative republic of Yugoslavia had shown that the Member States could no longer cope with crises and conflicts in Europe without the implementation of common rules and a decision-making in the military field. Apparently, the direct involvement of the European Union and political pressure to establish the common security policy was caused by the fact that those conflicts occurred in Europe. Declaration of St. Malo (1998) declared that “the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO” (Deighton, 2002, p. 725). On the basis of St. Malo declaration, negotiated primarily by France and the United Kingdom, was possible to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Cologne a year later (1999). European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was an integral part of the European Foreign and Security Policy although they were two separate policies. “The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an integral part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which ‘shall include all questions related to the security of the Union’ (Article 17.1 TEU). The institutional frameworks of CFSP and ESDP broadly overlap, although the specific operational character of ESDP has triggered the creation of a distinctive subset of institutions primarily charged with the planning and conduct of crisis management operations.” (Grevi & Keohane, 2009, p. 19)

Consequently, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was launched in 2000 as an advisory body for the ESDP in the issues of crisis management. The body of the CIVCOM as the crucial and the most important policy of ESDP was composed of the representatives of Member states. Beside the intergovernmental nature of the CIVCOM, the Feira (Portugal) European Council (June 2000) managed to define the core civilian aspects of crisis management in the four priority areas: police; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration and civil protection2 have become the main crisis management areas which also define a character of each mission’s management till today. Later, in 2004, were added two further areas, the monitoring and supporting EU Special Representatives (Chivvis, 2010, p. 6).

Following the world affairs, security and defense changes after the 11th September 2001, the EU and NATO implemented the Berlin Plus Agreements (December 2002) to “govern relations between the EU and NATO in crisis management.” (Bindi, 2010, p. 37) The close ties between the EU and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation were visible even after the Berlin Plus Agreements which should clarify the process of organization management. As Keukeleire pointed out “The Berlin Plus arrangements were both pragmatic and symbolic: pragmatic because the Europeans lacked the core equipment and logistics necessary to conduct major military operations within the ESDP framework, symbolic because it also institutionalized for many member states the essential interlinking of the EU with NATO.” (Keukeleire, 2010, p. 57)3 Shortly after the Berlin Plus, Agreements was launched the first civilian mission, the European Union Police Mission in Bosna and Herzegovina (EUPM) in January 2003. The important part of organization management of the EUPM was the first test of crisis management concepts, procedures, and instruments, but also the transition from the UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia (IPTF) (Juncos et al., 2007, pp. 47-48). The main objective of “the mission was to engage in mentoring, monitoring and inspecting activities (Merlingen, 2010, p. 164). Following the first police/civilian mission in Western Balkans, on 31 March 2003, the Operation Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was launched as the first military operation of the ESDP. The mandate of the EUFOR Concordia was to “ensure the follow-on to NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony.” (Juncos et al., 2007, p. 134) Lately, in December 2004 the EU launched its largest military mission, EU Force (EUFOR), Althea, taking over from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) (Juncos et al., 2007, p. 47). The overview on the first military and civilian/police missions is based on the assumption that the organization of crisis management relied on the previous operations of United Nations or the NATO. We can assume that the first missions of the ESDP thus played a role of complementary and supportive actions to the crisis management of other international security organizations.

From the institutional perspective, in 2003 was adopted a document, known as the European Security Strategy, which carries out the ambition to be a core strategy for further changes of the foreign policy. However, as Bindi and Shapiro pointed out “creating a strategy document is not the same as having a strategy. The formulation of a security strategy is (or should be) a political process, an effort to build consensus around a broad approach to securing a polity’s interests. It is much more than just a document.” (Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 343) Even the European Security Strategy was performed as a conceptual defence and security policy, the document brought “just” the definitions of global threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime)4, and the institutional framework. Nevertheless, after the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the performance of the European Security and Defence Policy after 2003, the number of civilian crisis actions has increased by the number of 17 ongoing missions5. “The ESS designated three strategic roles for the EU: providing regional security in the European neighborhood, satisfying the requirements of conflict and threat prevention, and enhancing the prospects for a rule-based, multilateral international order – captured by the aspiration to ‘effective multilateralism’ regionally and globally.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 598) the ESS introduced and developed the strategy of preventive engagement (Sperling, 2014) which could be considered as part of pre-crisis management mechanism.

Lately, in 2007, the ESDP established a common strategy in the formation of rapid reaction forces known as “battlegroup”, which became the most important aspect of crisis management6. The creation of the European military rapid forces could be seen as a great step not even from the personal perspective of organizational management, but also from the prism of overcoming a “frozen” integration in ESDP. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty (2008) introduced a coherent coordination body (the European External Action Service/the EEAS), and also renamed the European Security and Defence Policy as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)7 by which directed the foreign policy towards closer political integration. Nevertheless, “the Treaty of Lisbon both thoroughly modifies the institutional context of ESDP and introduces more specific innovations pertaining to this policy area as such.” (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009, p. 60) From the perspective of limitations of defense and security actions, the crisis management relies mostly on the personal cooperation with other international organizations. “All ESDP military operations, except Concordia, have taken place under a UN mandate. Aside from clear benefits at the political, operational and tactical level, good cooperation and coordination with these actors are also a key dimension of EU support to effective multilateralism” (Grevi,& Helly,& Keohane, 2009, p. 408). On one hand, the performance of crisis management depends on a personal assistance of NATO or UN, which personal capacities are trained concerning the aim of those organizations and the performance of the European military management could be considered as supportive. On the other hand, there is an option for non-military/civilian actions conducted by the EU. The next part of paper is dealing with the development of crisis management after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. As will be analyzed bellow, the option to perform civilian missions has shaped into a developing institutionalization of civilian crisis management.

3. Institutionalization of the European Crisis Management Policy after the Lisbon Treaty

The European civil crisis management has been established based on the common foreign and security strategy and developed by the years of the European integration. Nevertheless, the European crisis management is a relatively new policy contributing to the common security structures. The civilian crisis management is an instrument of the international actors to help create the stability and secure regimes in countries which have a lack of those capabilities. From the geopolitical perception, it could be considered as one of the soft power tools how to identify the global actors in the processes of democratization or regime stabilization. As James Sperling pointed out, the common European security policies were developed by three principles: the solidarity, subsidiarity, and sovereignty (Sperling, 2014, p. 594). These three principles, prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), have made the ESDP as one of the new communitarian policies. On these principles, is also shaped the institutional framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. Regard to this perspective, the main point of the European Union civilian crisis management is that has been limited by the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (described above). The institutional basis lays on the European External Action Service (EEAS), established by the Lisbon Treaty and launched on 1 January 2011. As the European Union's diplomatic service, it helps the EU's foreign affairs chief – the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – carry out the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy8. The High Representative as a chief of EU's foreign and security policy, known as the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) and the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' (CSDP), coordinates more than 140 delegations of the European Union worldwide. Because of the autonomy of the EEAS9, from the perspective of a multilevel model of European governance, the High Representative (today Frederica Mogherini) is also the vice-president of the European Commission, chief of the European Council for foreign affairs, the political power of this position could be considered as more than influential. The formal leadership of the High Representative (Tallberg, 2006) in the civilian missions is constituted by the European law (the Lisbon treaty), but also accountable by a legitimate mandate of the informal role in the European foreign policy structures (Helwig, 2015, p. 89). In general, the EEAS is launching the civilian crisis management missions mainly in African and the Middle East territories10. These missions are held predominantly as a crisis management mechanism of conflict resolution under the directorate of Department for Crisis Response & Operational Coordination11. According to the official web page, the main task of the Office after the Lisbon Treaty is a coordination of the European initiatives in crisis response12.

From the perspective of stabilization and a post-conflict management, in 1992, was proposed an initiative of the European Commission (Jacques Delors Commission) to create a mechanism for humanitarian aid and civil protection as a prevention of local conflicts. The European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) was established on the basis of solidarity to third countries and as a complementary institution to the international network of humanitarian aid, such as Red Cross, UN Agencies (ECHO Annual Report 2014, pp. 20-21). Since 2009, under a renewed name as The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department, has gained a mandate to a compliance policy of social, natural, and post-conflict reconciliation. With the annual budget of more than two billion euros, the ECHO humanitarian aid has made of the EU institutions the third biggest donor in the world (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, 2016, p. 31). The ECHO is run by Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management and operating today in more than 80 countries (ECHO Annual Report 2014, p. 4). In my view, the involvement of the ECHO as a part of a post-recovery management in affected countries would reflect the current needs of organizational management research. However, the ECHO is mostly dealing with the post-conflict, post-natural disaster management, and has already developed its policies toward the support for the sustainability of regimes. For these purposes of civilian crisis management analysis, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department developed the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM). “The EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM) was in 2013 made up of 32 states (28 EU Member States plus the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), which cooperated in the field of civil protection and was created to support their efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to natural or man-made disasters either within or outside of the EU. The assistance can take the form of in-kind assistance, equipment, and teams, or involve sending experts to carry out assessments. It relies on government resources and if assistance is required in countries outside the EU, it usually works in parallel with humanitarian aid. The operational heart of EUCPM is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Any country inside or outside the EU affected by a disaster and overwhelmed by its magnitude can make an appeal for assistance through the ERCC.” (ECHO Annual Report 2013) With this respect, it could be assumed that the policies of the humanitarian aid and protection and the crisis management policies of the ESDP are mutual, even interconnected. Therefore, the values of crisis management provided by ECHO are based on a European solidarity towards third countries and also towards the internal affairs.

The complex overview of the institutionalization of the EEAS and the ECHO mechanism could be considered as a part of the crisis and post-crisis management. Additionally, the new approaches to the responsiveness of the European crisis management suggest that “the EU crisis management does not start with crisis response, but with early warning and conflict prevention.” (Hynek, 2011, p. 86) Consequently, the ensuring a coherent response to crisis shows recent efforts of the European Union to built even the pre-crisis capacities “to turn the comprehensive approach into comprehensive action”13. Within the framework of the EEAS and the ECHO mechanisms, the EU recently started to develop a resilience crisis management as a part of pre-conflict/prevention crisis management. The policy tool of the EEAS, the EU Early Warning System (launched in 2011), is a risk management policy tool to stress a conflict situation. Directed by the policy of EU Comprehensive Approach to External Crises and Conflicts, the EU’s “goal is not a prediction”14, but to address the warning system gap in crisis prevention. “The principle of preventive engagement (adopted by the European Security Strategy in 2003) is directed towards the external milieu and has the overarching goals of developing effective civilian crisis management capabilities, contributing to regional stability, mitigating ongoing civil conflicts, and promoting civil liberties, the rule of law and democratic government.“ (Sperling, 2014, p. 599) It could be said that a good crisis management of the current crises in the world should be seen through the prism of a resilience management theory. As Braes and Brooks (2010) pointed out, the “resilience is neither a plan nor a checklist. The capacity for resilience is found in an organization’s culture, attitudes, and values.” (Braes & Brooks, 2010, p. 17) Even the resilience management is connected to the organism itself and came from the psychology studies of self-maintenance (Coutu, 2002), the European Union resilience management contributes as the external factor of resilience. The EU has been able to support the process of prevention of humanitarian crises by developing the comprehensive analysis. For this purpose, the European Commission has launched the Index of Risk Management (INFORM) in 2014 as a policy indicator for understanding the crises. The INFORM as the first global data set for a risk management is “a joint initiative of the European Commission and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team (IASC) for Preparedness and Resilience, in partnership with Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UK Department for International Development (DFID), World Bank, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), UN agencies, and many others.”15 The comprehensiveness of the INFORM dataset relies on the three dimensions (Hazard&Exposure, Vulnerability, and Lack of Coping Capacity), six categories (Natural, Human, Socio-economic, Vulnerable Groups, Institutional, Infrastructure) and seventeen components (Earthquake, DRR, Governance, Current Conflict Intensity, etc.)16. The preparedness of crisis management embodied in the INFORM analysis offers the EEAS a manual for response and resilience crisis management. For the long-term crisis management perspective, the INFORM performs an effective planning and pre-crisis management. Moreover, the future development and adoption of the INFORM policy tool as a compliance to the EEAS and the ECHO policies would maintain a desirable proactive and reactive resilience management to deal with risks and threats (Braes & Brooks, 2010, p. 16).

4. Analysis of Financial Capacities and their Impact

The first precondition to effective crisis management is to adjust the financial capacities. The European Union for its security governance (between years 1997 to 2013) contributed 7,61% of the overall budget which represents more than 151 billion of euros (Table 1). Respectfully to the financial capacity of EU to provide the missions, there can be a dispute over the resources for the development of further actions. Besides military and human resources, the equipment of weapons suffers from a lack of financial sources (Sperling, 2014, p. 595). James Sperling (2014) categorized the security governance expenditure according to four policy areas: protection, assurance, prevention, compellence. The compellence is represented as direct military operations, the prevention represents the ESS strategy of “preventive engagement” and enlargement financial policy, the assurance is embodied as a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction of regimes, the protection is based on the strategy of border security and performs also the internal facilitation of judicial and police cooperation (Sperling, 2014, pp. 600-612). Based on Sperling analysis, we can track the increasing expenditures for the strategy of “preventive engagement” where the significant role plays civilian crisis management of development and humanitarian aid. With the overall share of almost 85%, the prevention budgetary expenditures show how much the EU is strengthening the non-military missions. “The tiny share of compellence expenditures merely reflects the intergovernmental basis of funding EU military operations; policies of assurance and protection have relatively low shares, owing to the dominance of national governments in the quest for internal security and the reliance upon seconded military, police and judicial authorities for the purpose of post-conflict state-building.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 600).

Table 1. Total expenditures on security governance, 1997–2013 (as share of Commission budget)

Source: Sperling, J. (2014). The Eu as a Security Actor: Prevention, Protection, Assurance and Compellence in (Sperling Sperling (ed.) 2014, p. 600)

The development of the EEAS actions to these days has shown two classifications of missions: completed and ongoing missions, military and civil missions (Table 2). The division is constituted by a military presence at actions and thus categorizes them to the civilian-military operations and “pure” civilian missions. As Tables 2 shows, the provision of civilian missions is prevailing over the military operations through the time with the share 22 to 12. Consequently, based on the development of the ESDP and personal capacities of European military capability analyzed above, the civilian missions dominate the Common Foreign and Security Policy in time.

The Table 2 shows that the civilian missions are divided into few categories depends on a character of the action. There are prevailing the police missions (EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL Kinshasa in DRC, EUPOL RD Congo, EUPOL COPPS in Palestina, EUPOL Afghanistan), followed by the civil protection missions (AMIS EU, EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUCAP Nestor, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya), the rule of law missions (EUJUST Themis, EUJUST Lex Iraq, EUPT Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo) and the monitoring/advisory missions (Aceh AMM, EUMM Georgia, EUAM Ukraine) (Table 2). Concerning the territorial division and the type of action perspective, there are cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African rep., Kosovo, Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EEAS has deployed several types of the missions. For instance, in Macedonia, there were carried out two types of missions, the military operation (Concordia FYROM in 2003) followed by the police and advisory mission (EUPAT FYROM in 2005).

Table 2. Overview of completed and ongoing military and civilian missions of European crisis management

Eufor Concordia/Fyrom

Eufor Tchad/Rca

Eufor Althea

Eunavfor Atalanta

Civilian-Military Missions

Artemis Dr Congo

Eufor Rca Central African Rep.

Eunavfor Med

Eutm Mali

Eufor Rd Congo


Eumam Rca

Eutm Somalia

Eupol Kinshasa (Police Mission)

Eupol Rd Congo (Police Mission)

Eupol Copps (Police Mission)

Eubam Rafah (Border Control)

Civilian Missions

Eupat Concordia/Fyrom (Police Advisory Team)

Eujust Themis (Rule Of Law Mission)

Eupol Afganistan (Civilian/Police)

Eulex Kosovo (Rule Of Law)

Amm (Aceh Monitoring Mission)

Eupm (Police Mission)

Eumm Georgia (Monitoring Mission)

Eucap Nestor (Maritime Security Support)

Eu Ssr Guinea-Bissau (Civil-Military)

Eujust Lex (Rule Of Law)

Eucap Sahel Niger(Police Training)

Euam (Advisory Mission)

Euavsec (Airport Security Support)

Eubam (Civil Protection)

Eubam (Civil Protection)

Eucap Sahel (Civil Protection)

Eusec Rd (Civil Protection)

Completed Missions

Ongoing Missions

Source: Author’s Proceedings

5. Discussions and Conclusion

Regarding the quotation of Sperling that “nonetheless, the EU possesses the comparative diplomatic advantage of implementing long-term conflict prevention or peace-building measures than undertaking peacemaking or peace enforcement missions.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 612), this paper demonstrated the thesis by analyzing the historical performance, institutional development and financial relations to the crisis management. One of the conclusions based on historical circumstances is that the military missions are still provided by the cooperation with NATO, UN or is conducted by the Member States themselves either like complementary forces or like cooptation. This system of governance has not yet produced a clear division of labor between the EU and its member states, but it has gone beyond a system of governance where the EU and its member states simply govern the security environment concurrently and in parallel (Ekengren et al., 2006, pp. 119-120). As was described, a number of civilian missions prevail over the military actions. This observation brings the analysis to the assumption that the European Union development of crisis management in defense policies is not under the common institutional decision-making body and the effectiveness of the provision of each mission depends on shared competencies of the European External and Action Service with the European Commission or the Council of European Union. Regardless the comprehensive crisis management, founding the basic principles in the European Security Strategy of pre-crisis management, such as preventive engagement, the main target of the European Security and Action Service competence is based on the improvement of soft-power policies. The crisis management is thus considered as a complex system of prevention, responsive and post-crisis management. Recently, the EU has already adopted its institutional mechanism towards a goal of resilience crisis management. Concerning the future development, found on the historical progress, the strengthening the pre-crisis management tools would continue till the European Union would like to demonstrate its regional and international role in world politics.

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1 PhD Candidate, Faculty of Organisation Studies in Novo mesto, Slovenia, Address: Novi trg 5, 8000 Novo Mesto, Tel.: +386 (0) 59 074 164, Corresponding author:

AUDRI, Vol. 9, no 2/2016, pp. 5-21

2 Secretariat, P. E. C. (2009). European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management. Brussels, August. Available at

3 Under these arrangements (Berlin Plus Agreements), the EU can either conduct an operation autonomously by making use of the operational headquarters of one of the member states or use NATO assets and capabilities. If it opts for the second alternative, the EU can ask for access to NATO’s planning facilities, can request that NATO make available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation, and can request the use of NATO capabilities.” (Keukeleire, 2010, p. 57)

4 Souce:

5 Source:

6 EU Battlegroups. Available at

7 Source:

9 “The EEAS formal structures and all senior appointments were in place by early 2011 and the service began its work as a “functionally autonomous body” headed up by the HR (High Representative).” (Allen, 2012, p. 653)

10 Source:

11 Source:

12 Source:


15 Index for Risk Management-INFORM: Concept and Methodology, Version 2016. Publications Office, 2015. Available at

16 Ibid.


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